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The recent rise of shareholder engagement has revamped companies’
corporate governance structures so as to empower shareholder rights and to
constrain managerial opportunism. Notwithstanding the general trend, this
Article uncovers corporate spin-off transactions—which divide a single
company into two or more companies—as a unique mechanism that insulates the
management from shareholder intervention. In a spin-off, the company’s
managers can fundamentally change the governance arrangements of the new
spun-off company without being subject to monitoring mechanisms, such as
shareholder approval or market check. Those changes often empower managers
over shareholders. Furthermore, most spin-off transactions enjoy tax
benefits. The potential agency problems associated with the managers’ unilateral
governance changes can be further compounded when the managers
adopt multiple classes of common stock with unequal voting rights (“dual-class
stock”) in the new spun-off company without shareholder approval.
This is the first Article to systematically examine the problem from both
corporate and tax law perspectives and to offer possible solutions. The Article
argues that when the managers’ unilateral governance changes are substantial,
certain adjustments to corporate and tax laws may be necessary to curb
managerial opportunism. For instance, under corporate law, when spin-off
transactions accompany a charter amendment, shareholder approval, either at the
state law level or company charter level, can be mandated. In addition, tax law
can revisit the “continuity of interest” requirement to evaluate whether material
changes in shareholder voting rights can disqualify certain spin-offs from taxfree treatment. The Article will also present new insights into the long-standing
debate on dual-class stock by showing how the perceived risk of dual-class stock
can be magnified when combined with spin-off transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose A, B, C, and D share one pepperoni pizza. Each paid exactly one
quarter of the pizza price and all equally like pepperoni. Suppose A was in
charge of dividing the pizza evenly. Initially the pizza was cut in four slices,
but A thought each pizza slice was too big to hold and cut each slice further
in half without asking the others. Now the pizza is cut in eight identicallysized slices. The pepperoni toppings were relatively evenly-distributed when
the pizza was sliced in four, but not anymore when sliced in eight because
some of the toppings were bunched. A chose two pizza slices with the most
pepperoni toppings, and B, C, and D got two slices each with visibly less
pepperoni toppings than A’s slices. Given the situation, B, C, and D all claim
that A’s decision to cut the pizza into eight slices resulted in unequal
distribution of the pizza. Specifically, they argue that A should have asked for
B, C, and D’s agreement before the division. Alternatively, they say that A
should pay more for the pizza because A got more pepperoni toppings. Should
dividing the pizza into the same number of equally-sized slices but with
different toppings be treated as an equal distribution of the pizza? Or, should
A pay more because of getting more toppings? Would it be different if A got
approval from the others to divide in that way?
This division of pepperoni pizza provides a hypothetical, somewhat
sophomoric, but perhaps serves as a useful lens to understand the current realworld issue associated with corporate spin-offs. This Article criticizes that
neither corporate law nor tax law properly addresses the new phenomenon of
“proportional in number of stock (i.e., same number of equal-sized pizza
slices) but differential in benefit attached to the stock (i.e., different amount
of toppings on each pizza slice)” problem arising from corporate spin-offs.
Both laws have rarely considered the differences in rights attached to stock as
long as the distributed number of stock is “pro-rata” to stock ownership. The
Article argues that the rights attached to stock should be taken into account in
evaluating spin-offs in order to prevent opportunistic management insulation
from shareholder intervention.
A corporate spin-off divides a company into more than two independent
public companies. 1 As a result, it creates a new spun-off public company
(“SpinCo”) by distributing the new company’s stock to the parent company
1

See, e.g., WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, SPIN-OFF GUIDE 1 (2018) [hereinafter
WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE], http://www.wlrk.com/files/2018/SpinOffGuide.pdf. For a
detailed timeline for a spin-off transaction, see Paul Hammes et al., Tax-Free Spin-off
Roadmap,
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-tax-free-spin-offroadmap/$FILE/EY-tax-free-spin-off-roadmap.pdf.
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(“ParentCo”)’s existing shareholders in the form of dividends proportionally
to their stock ownership. A spin-off offers unfettered discretion for managers.
On the one hand, unlike an Initial Public Offering (“IPO”), i.e., the very first
sale of a new company’s stock to the public, a new SpinCo does not need to
worry about the market reaction to the SpinCo’s various features including
governance arrangements. This is because the SpinCo stock is internally
distributed to the existing ParentCo’s shareholders. 2 On the other hand, a
spin-off has been consistently treated as a way to distribute dividends to
ParentCo’s shareholders, which is within managers’ discretion under current
corporate law. Thus, ParentCo’s managers can decide whether, when, and
how to make dividends through the form of a spin-off without shareholder
approval.3 An important assumption for such lack of shareholder approval in
a spin-off is that there are no fundamental changes to shareholder rights
before and after the spin-off. Furthermore, the same assumption of mere
change in forms of ownership also functions as a basis for tax-free benefit for
spin-offs. The recent practice, however, shows that the consequences of spinoff may be far more transformative than a simple dividend distribution.4
For illustration, when managers of ConocoPhillips (ParentCo) separated
its refining business into a stand-alone public company called Phillips 66
(SpinCo) through a spin-off transaction in 2012, they also had full discretion
2

See infra Part I.B.1. For instance, while each shareholder can trade the SpinCo stock
individually on the market later on, the individual shareholder rather than the SpinCo will
bear the costs of potentially entrenching governance arrangements. In that sense, managers
who initially design the SpinCo’s governance arrangements have little incentive to optimize
them.
3
See infra Part I.B.2. While corporate law defers spin-off decisions to directors, the
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) substantially oversees spin-offs through Form 10
registration statement filings pursuant to Section 12(b) or (g) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. Since spin-offs involve the issuance of new stock, SpinCo must file Form 10, a
registration form for spin-offs, with the SEC. See 17 CFR 240.12b or 240.12g. The typical
SEC review process begins with SpinCo’s submission of its initial Form 10 filing with the
SEC. The SEC generally provides comments within 30 days of an initial Form 10 filing. The
Form 10 will not be declared effective by the SEC until SpinCo has responded to all
comments and the responses have been cleared by the SEC. See WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE,
supra note 1, at 41. The SEC’s oversight, however, does not effectively extend to corporate
governance issues. While Form 10 filings submitted to the SEC contain SpinCo’s charters
as exhibits, the SEC also—even more than typical court—tends to defer the optimal
corporate governance arrangements to managers of each company.
4
See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Agents Protecting Agents: An Empirical
Study of Takeover Defenses in Spinoffs, Working Paper (2004), at 3 [hereinafter Agents
Protecting Agents] (“Comparing spinoffs to their parent firms, we find that spinoffs tend to
have more takeover protection than their parents and that entrenchment of spinoff
management is costly to parent shareholders.”); W ACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE supra note 1,
at 22. (“In many spin-offs and IPOs, the spin-off company has more antitakeover provisions
in its charter and bylaws than the parent.”).
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to adopt an initial corporate charter for Phillips 66. The SpinCo’s charter was
modeled after ParentCo’s charter provisions almost verbatim. On top of those
identical provisions, the managers added a charter provision allowing a
staggered board of directors in the new SpinCo. 5 The adoption of the
staggered board—a powerful defensive device for management—went in the
opposite direction of the recent mainstream trend of eliminating staggered
boards in other public companies. 6 More notably, the adoption of the
staggered board provision for the SpinCo was subject to neither shareholder
approval nor market-pricing checks.7 Also, the spin-off transaction was able
to avoid paying taxes on the built-in gain in Phillips 66, which would have
been imposed if ConocoPhillips simply sold its refining business instead of
spinning it off.8 As such, the spin-off transaction provided an extraordinarily
counterintuitive opportunity for Phillips 66, which became a new stand-alone
public company, to adopt the effective anti-takeover provision without
shareholder approval or market checks. This opportunity also allowed
Phillips66 to enjoy juicy tax-free benefits. As shown in the Phillips 66
example, empirical data has suggested that managers tend to stretch their
discretion in spin-offs even to set governance arrangements in a way to
empower themselves over shareholders and to make them less accountable to
shareholders.9
Does this phenomenon conform to the assumption that there are no
fundamental changes before and after the spin-off? If ParentCo’s managers
add a new provision affecting the allocation of power between shareholders
5

See AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF PHILLIPS 66, Fifth
A. (May 2, 2012); AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF
CONOCOPHILLIPS, Fifth A. (Jul. 28, 2008).
6
See, e.g., Erik Krusch, Corporate Governance: Staggered U.S. Boards Are
Endangered Species, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/financialregulatory-forum/2011/03/23/corporate-governance-staggered-u-s-boards-are-endangeredspecies/ (“The overwhelming trend in corporate governance is towards the declassification
of boards and this year is no exception, with several shareholder proposals calling for
declassification making their way onto 2011 proxies.”).
7
See infra Part I.B.1.
8
See Anna Driver, Conoco Board Approves Spin-off of Refining Unit, REUTERS (Apr. 4,
2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-conocophillips/conoco-board-approves-spin-offof-refining-unit-idUSBRE83318820120404.
9
Adopting anti-takeover provisions in SpinCo’s corporate charter, such as a staggered
board, is a good example of the governance rearrangements. A recent empirical study on
corporate opportunity waivers shows that managers tend to opt out of the fiduciary duty of
loyalty when they have an option to waive the duty. The corporate opportunity waivers are
common in SpinCo particularly when multiple ParentCo managers also sit on SpinCo. See,
e.g., Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty:
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075–1152
(2017).
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and managers into a SpinCo’s charter, the change is not likely a mere
distribution anymore. The assumption for special treatment for spin-offs is
under attack. Going back to the pizza analogy, it might be the distribution of
the same number of equal-sized pizza slices (i.e., proportional number of
stock) to stakeholders, but managers who decide to separate the pizza (i.e.,
ParentCo managers) unevenly allocate pepperoni toppings (e.g., differential
voting rights) and take the most lucrative pieces. Such governance changes
through corporate charters are considered fundamental changes to the
companies, and shareholder approval is necessary in all cases—except in
spin-offs.
The current procedural privilege for spin-offs, which enables managers’
unilateral governance changes, raises concerns about potential managerial
entrenchment. It seems that the lack of a monitoring mechanism for
governance changes over spin-offs would facilitate the managers’
opportunistic governance changes and thus increases agency costs out of
entrenchment. Even when managers implement anti-takeover provisions in a
SpinCo to advance shareholder value, this legitimate incentive does not
necessarily justify the elimination of a checking mechanism due to the
rigidity of corporate charters. State corporate laws require mutual consent
between managers and shareholders to amend corporate charters, so that
neither shareholders nor managers can change corporate charters
unilaterally. 10 Thus, once ParentCo managers implement an anti-takeover
provision in a SpinCo’s charter, shareholders cannot take it off without
managers’ consent. Because the efficiency of anti-takeover provisions is
volatile as the company’s other features evolve (e.g., ownership structure,
company age, or company size), an efficient anti-takeover provision at the
time of the adoption would not be necessarily efficient ten years after the
adoption. Because most anti-takeover provisions inherently have a selfserving element to managers by securing their tenure on the board, the
adoption of an “efficient-for-now” anti-takeover provision is always
vulnerable to managerial entrenchment. 11
The agency problems inherent in the managers’ unilateral governance
changes described above can significantly be compounded when ParentCo’s
managers adopt a dual-class stock structure in SpinCo’s charter without
shareholder approval. Dual-class stock, which involves two or more classes
of common stock with unequal voting rights, has been on rise. By adopting a
dual-class stock structure, one class of shareholders receives a higher voting
right per share than the others.12 Often times, trading high-vote stock on the
10

See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2014).
See infra Part II.A.1.
12
For instance, the voting rights ratio between Facebook’s Class A and Class B
11
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market is even prohibited by corporate charters. Thus, dual-class stock is one
of the most effective tactics for a small number of insiders to retain corporate
control without corresponding equity interests. 13 As shareholder voting
remains the primary tool for incorporating shareholders’ voice into corporate
decisions, any deviation from the one-share-one-vote standard (e.g., by
adopting dual-class stock structure) is required to be explicitly set forth in the
company’s charter.14 Nevertheless, as this Article reveals, a spin-off offers
leeway for managers to switch to the dual-class structure post-IPO stage. The
adoption of dual-class stock through spin-off not only bypasses the
shareholder approval requirement for a charter amendment under corporate
law, but it also overrides the rules of the major stock exchanges that prohibit
a post-IPO switch from a one-share-one-vote principle to dual-class stock
except through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).15
As such, ParentCo managers’ unilateral governance changes through a
SpinCo charter are likely to make fundamental changes to a company before
and after the spin-off. These changes should not be eligible for special
treatment (i.e., no shareholder approval) under corporate law.
The deviation from the assumption of no fundamental changes before
and after the spin-off also has significant implications for tax law treatment
of spin-offs. The reason that tax law offers a tax-free benefit to certain spinoffs is that if a corporate reorganization through spin-offs is a mere change in
form and yet more efficient for the business, tax law will facilitate such
transactions by deferring tax liability that should have been imposed on the
separating transaction. 16 The tax benefit is so attractive that the popularity of
stockholders is 1:10. Mark Zuckerberg and a small group of insiders of insiders hold Class
B high vote stock. See AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF
FACEBOOK, INC., Article IV.3.2. (Jun. 20, 2016).
13
Facebook’s Class B stockholders including Mark Zuckerberg own approximately 18%
of the company’s share, but control nearly 70% of the voting power. See Bob Pisani,
Shareholders Won’t Force Zuckerberg’s Hand in Facebook Management, CNBC (Mar. 21,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/20/shareholders-wont-force-zuckerbergs-hand-infacebook-management.html.
14
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 212(a) (“Unless otherwise provided in the
certificate of incorporation…each stockholder shall be entitled to 1 vote for each share of
capital stock held by such stockholder.”); Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. §7.21(a) (“[U]nless
the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, each outstanding share, regardless of class or
series, is entitled to one vote on each matter voted on at a shareholders’ meeting.”).
15
NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 313.00 (1992); NASDAQ Stock Market Rule
5640. Public companies cannot amend their charters to adopt dual-class stock even when
their shareholders approve it without giving up their inclusion on major stock exchanges.
16
Legislative history and Treasury Regulations explain that the purpose of the tax-free
treatment of reorganization transactions is to make exceptions from the general rule for
certain “readjustments of corporate structures . . . as are required by business exigencies”
and “which effect only a readjustment of the shareholder’s continuing interest in property
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corporate spin-offs largely derives directly from the tax-free benefit status of
the spin-off. While tax-free benefits are not the only or primary reason for
corporate spin-offs, spin-offs are often conditioned on their tax-free status.17
In that sense, the dynamic of corporate spin-offs cannot be accurately
understood without considering the element of taxation. However, if the
governance changes during spin-offs are considered to be fundamental
changes of the company, it is hard to justify tax-free benefits for those spinoffs. Nonetheless, current tax law fails to scrutinize the problem, which this
Article aims to address.
This Article does not claim that managers’ discretion regarding a
corporate spin-off in general should be constrained. Rather, it highlights the
potential risks of unconstrained managerial discretion over governance
arrangements during spin-offs, which deviates from the initial intent of both
corporate and tax legislation on the issue. Also, given the increasing
popularity of both corporate spin-offs and dual-class stock issuances in recent
years,18 the adoption of dual-class stock in corporate spin-offs seems likely
to expand. As the first academic paper that provides a cooperative analysis of
both corporate law and tax law issues in spin-offs, this Article not only
reveals a new practice largely ignored by previous literature, but also
contributes to multiple strands of academic literature.
First, it adds another important, but underdiscussed, specific situation
that expands the managers’ tendency to exercise their discretion to advance
their own benefits over shareholders’ to the situations brought out by the prior
literature. 19 Second, because the Article examines spin-offs together with
dual-class stock, it connects with the current, sometimes heated debate on
whether dual-class stock is conducive to shareholder value. 20 Amid the
raging debate over dual-class stock, however, both supporters and opponents
under modified corporate forms.” For acquisitive reorganizations, such as mergers and
acquisitions, see Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b); for divisive reorganization, such as spin-off, see
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986,
at 337 (1987) and Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1).
17
See infra Part I.C.1.
18
See, e.g., WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1 (“The volume of spin-offs in
2017 increased slightly from 2016 to approximately $132 billion.”); Andrea Tan & Benjamin
Robertson, Dual-Class Shares Are Coming Under Fire-Again, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sep. 27,
2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-27/can-democracy-stage-acomeback-at-stock-exchanges (“One percent of U.S. IPOs had weighted voting rights in
2005, according to Sutter Securities Inc. in San Francisco; a decade later 15 percent did, with
technology companies making up more than half the total.”).
19
See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 9 (discussing managers tendency in the context
of waiving fiduciary duty of loyalty); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and
Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1549–1595 (2010) (critizing managerial opportunism in
a bunded shareholder approval of a merger itself and a new corporate charter.).
20
See infra Part II.B.
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pay little attention to the situation where managers can unilaterally adopt
dual-class stock or change existing voting rights for each class, specifically
through corporate spin-offs.
Third, this Article updates the tax law literature on the “continuity of
interest” requirement in spin-offs that has not been reviewed since the early
2000s. The continuity of interest doctrine requires that shareholders of
ParentCo continue their proprietary interest in SpinCo more than at a certain
level. Along with other requirements for tax-free spinoffs, this requirement
is supposed to guarantee that the spin-off is a mere change in corporate forms.
However, the continuity of interest requirement fails to review whether spinoffs with significant governance changes could still be viewed as mere
changes in form and thus deserving of tax-free benefits. This Article offers
critiques on current rules from a policy and legal perspective. Furthermore,
this Article advances the debate on the efficacy and merit of current tax law
influencing corporate governance and agency costs.
Finally, this Article argues that the current legal regime regarding spinoffs fails to address potential agency problems, specifically when a SpinCo
adopts dual-class stock and proposes possible incentives or deterrents in
important policy implications both to corporate and tax law. Specifically, it
proposes that corporate law should consider a shareholder approval
requirement for spin-offs that are sizable, or that substantially amend a
SpinCo charter. At the same time, tax law needs to revisit the continuity of
interest requirement to evaluate to what extent a spin-off involving
governance changes can be treated as a tax-free (or tax-deferred) transaction.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I overviews the legal rules on spinoffs in both corporate and tax law. It explains how spin-offs may be executed
without shareholder approval and how spin-offs enjoy tax-free benefits. Part
II shows that adopting dual-class stock via spin-off may exacerbate agency
problems incurred by unilateral governance changes before and after the spinoff. It also explains why this phenomenon raises normative and doctrinal
concerns about the associated tax-free benefits. In addition to theoretical
analysis, it presents real-world examples demonstrating both corporate and
tax problems. Part III urges lawmakers and/or companies to require
shareholder approval as an enhanced shareholder monitoring mechanism for
managers’ unilateral governance changes through spin-offs and to reconsider
the continuity of interest requirement in the Pilot Program on spin-offs
offered by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Part IV concludes.
I.

CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS AS TAX-FREE BUSINESS DECISION

In this Part, we explain how corporate spin-offs differ from other types
of corporate separations and to what extent managers have discretion in

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346805

10

Insulation by Separation

[27-Feb-19

shaping corporate governance arrangement for spun-off companies. We also
show how spin-offs utilize tax-free benefits. Depending on the technique of
corporate separation, legal constraints on managerial discretion vary
significantly.
A. Legal Boundaries of Spin-offs
A corporate spin-off, where a single public company is divided into more
than two stand-alone companies, is often regarded as the mirror image of a
corporate merger. In contrast to the vigorous discussion on M&A issues, the
volume of academic literature on corporate separations has been relatively
thin. Prior studies on corporate separations were mainly conducted by
financial economists focusing on the economic impacts of corporate breakups.21 Legal aspects of corporate separations have rarely been explored by
academics, despite the increase in volume of corporate separations in
practice.22 The scope of the term “spin-off” varies among academics, and it
is crucial to define the scope of corporate spin-offs as distinct from other
types of corporate separations.
1. Definition of Spin-offs
Unfortunately, the term corporate “spin-off” has been used inconsistently.
In its broadest meaning, the term encompasses many different types of
corporate separations. 23 But more often a “spin-off” indicates only a specific
type of corporate separation in a much narrower way. In this Article, a spinoff refers to a transaction that distributes the entire stock of a spun-off
company to shareholders of a parent company as dividends on a pro rata basis
such that the shareholders of a parent company hold stock of both the parent
and the spun-off companies (i.e., a typical 100% spin-off). This 100% spinoff has become a typical form of corporate separation and the most widely
used definition of corporate spin-offs. Corporate spin-offs are generally
subject to business judgment rule protection and also eligible for tax-free
21

See, e.g., Debra J. Aron, Using the Capital Market as a Monitor: Corporate Spinoffs
in an Agency Framework, 22 RAND J. OF ECON. 505 (1991); Mehrotra L. Daley & R.
Sivakumar, Corporate Focus and Value Creation Evidence from Spinoffs, 45(2) J. OF FIN.
ECON. 257 (1997); Thomas J. Chemmanur et al., Antitakeover Provisions in Corporate Spinoffs, 34 J. OF BANK. FIN. 813 (2010).
22
See WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1 (“The volume of spin-offs in 2017
increased slightly from 2016 to approximately $132 billion.”).
23
For instance, in prior literature, the term “spin-off” referred either to an equity carveout which involves a public offering of SpinCo or to comprehensive corporate separations.
See Daines & Klausner, Agents Protecting Agents, supra note 4 (discussing equity carve-out
only.).
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benefits.24 Before discussing the unique features of such transactions, it is
worth discussing several common spin-off variants; an appreciation of the
differences between these related transactions is critical.
Since the purpose of this Article is to examine a unique and largely
overlooked legal issue in corporate spin-offs, rather than to portray the
complete landscape of corporate separations, this Article exclusively focuses
on corporate spin-offs. Nevertheless, it is crucial to understand how corporate
spin-offs differ from other types of corporate separations. After all, when
these corporate spin-offs combine with public offerings or mergers as
discussed below, the combination cures the lack of monitoring mechanism
problem to some extent.
The first type combines corporate spin-offs with a public sale: the “equity
carve-out.” Because this transaction involves offering new securities to the
public rather than a distribution to ParentCo’s existing body of shareholders,
the separation is subject to the market checks applicable to Initial Public
Offerings (“IPO”). In order to maximize the market price of the stock at its
IPO, managers have incentive to minimize managerial opportunism in all
aspects of the company. By contrast, a typical spin-off is not subject to this
price mechanism. In addition to the market checks, corporate separation with
public offerings can also be subject to shareholder approval. State corporate
laws generally give managers as agents of a corporation power to sell
corporate assests without shareholder approval. When a corporation sells “all
or subtantially all” of its assets, the sale requires approval of a majority of the
outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote. 25 Another type of
corporate separation is a separation combined with a concurrent merger: the
“spin-merger.” Typically in this case, after a spin-off, either SpinCo or
ParentCo merges with a third party. 26 When a parent company merges with a
third party, the parent company’s shareholder approval is required to
effectuate the merger. By contrast, when a spun-off company merges with a
third party right after a spin-off, managers of a parent company can bypass
getting the Spinco’s shareholders’ approval by getting shareholder approval
before the spin-off. Spin-mergers are eligible for tax-free benefits under
certain conditions.
These two types of corporate separations must be conceptually
distinguished from a typical spin-off, and they do not share the agency
24

For detailed tax-free benefits for spin-offs, see infra Part I.C.
For instance, DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 122 (4) states, “Every corporation… shall
have power… to sell… all or any of its property and assets . . .”, but the power is limited by
the shareholder approval requirement for “all or substantially all” assets at DGCL Section
271(a).
26
Even among spin-mergers, when a SpinCo merger with a buyer before a ParentCo
distributes stock, a spin-merger can bypass shareholder voting on the merger. See WACHTELL
SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 10.
25
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problems that arise in typical spin-offs. After all, equity carve-outs are subject
to market checks, and spin-mergers are subject to shareholder approval. Each
of these corporate separations are accountable to at least one monitoring
mechanism, and managers’ discretion regarding the separation is thus limited
to that extent. By contrast, managers can exercise greater discretion when
they pursue a typical spin-off.
2. Purpose of Spin-offs
Corporations are not static; they dynamically transform over time.
Multiple firms sometimes combine themselves into one, and at other times a
single firm breaks up into pieces. Both corporate mergers (or “acquisitive
reorganization” in tax terminology) and corporate separations 27 (or “divisive
reorganization”) demand sophisticated legal work throughout the process.
While corporate mergers have been viewed as the pinnacle of sophisticated
transactional techniques, corporate separations have received surprisingly
little attention from legal academia. In general, a corporate separation is a
complex deal, and it can be extremely difficult to identify the real motive
driving the deal or to evaluate the impact of the deal.
In most cases, however, a corporate separation is principally driven by a
valid business purpose. In dividing one business into two or more entities,
management pursues operational objectives (e.g., to enhance business focus),
financial objectives (e.g., to use more appropriate capital structure), or both. 28
In addition to the principal business reasons, tax treatment is known to be one
of the most crucial factors to consider. Most spin-offs have been using a
format of distribution of SpinCo’s stock to shareholders of the parent
company, and whether the stock distribution qualifies for tax-free dividends
often serves as a prerequisite for completing spin-offs.29 Compared with tax
consideration, the corporate governance implications of spin-offs have
received little emphasis until the recent uptick in shareholder activism. As a
rare opportunity to reform a company’s corporate governance arrangements
in a direction management prefers, law firms have started advising companies
to include management-empowering provisions in a governing document of
SpinCo.30
We use the term “corporate separation” in its broadest meaning that embraces all kinds
of divisive reorganizations including spin-offs, equity-carve outs, and split-ups.
28
Id. at 3.
29
For instance, in 2015, Yahoo called off a plan to spin-off its stake in Alibaba after the
IRS refused to grant a tax-free blessing. See Yahoo Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 9,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312515398244/d93711dex991.h
tm; see text accompanying infra notes 46–56.
30
For a detailed discussion, see infra Part I.B.2.
27
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All things considered, management’s ultimate goal in pursuing a spin-off,
at least nominally, is always to increase shareholder value. It is, however,
extremely difficult both to prove or rebut what really motivates such a move.
Rather than there existing one predominant shareholder-friendly reason, it is
more likely that multiple reasons are inseparably intertwined. Thus, this paper
does not argue that certain spin-offs are solely driven by managers’ selfinterests in corporate governance changes. Rather, it claims that the current
legal regime does not properly address the potential risk due to managers’
unfettered discretion in spin-offs used to significantly influence shareholder
rights. Even in cases where a change in corporate governance remains a mere
consequence of a spin-off, the protections afforded to managerial decisions
by courts warrant concern, because it is extremely difficult for shareholders
to reverse the change.
B. Governance Changes Without Monitoring Mechanisms
Practitioners advising corporate managers tend to recommend adoption
of anti-takeover provisions, such as a classified board, in a SpinCo’s
corporate charter. 31 Because a SpinCo is relatively small in size and
vulnerable to hostile takeovers, it needs anti-takeover provisions to protect
itself from takeover attempts. 32 The most unique trait of spin-offs is that the
transaction is subject to neither express shareholder approval nor market
check in adopting those anti-takeover provisions. In contrast, mergers and
acquisitions require an express shareholder approval, either in terms of voting
or through tender. Several mechanisms—primarily market pressures and
shareholder approval—are, in principle, supposed to rein in management’s
discretion by preventing transactions that are inefficient, wasteful, or whose
benefits inure primarily to management’s interests rather than those of the
shareholders. Also, in the case of an initial public offering or secondary
offering, there exists a market pricing mechanism that determines the amount
of proceeds the issuing corporation will receive. This can provide a
meaningful market check against inefficient transactions. As discussed below,
these mechanisms, while imperfect, have important consequences in many
transactions; critically, however, they are absent or weak in the spin-off
context.
1. No Market Pricing Mechanism
Traditional theory on the effect of anti-takeover provisions has argued
that a company which goes on the market for the first time (i.e., IPO) is under
31
32

WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 22-25.
Id.
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pressure to minimize the number of anti-takeover provisions in its charter. 33
The theory assumes that anti-takeover provisions lower a firm’s stock price
on the market because investors will be wary of the managers’ decreased
accountability by insulating incumbent directors from potential challenges.
Thus, companies that do go on to have an IPO have incentive to minimize the
number of anti-takeover provisions to attract more investors. Subsequent
empirical studies, however, have shown the puzzling phenomenon that many
companies include anti-takeover provisions in their IPO charters anyway.34
On the question of whether anti-takeover provisions in IPO charters were
intended to benefit shareholders or managers, studies found mixed results.35
As such, while the imperfect IPO pricing has its own limits in monitoring
opportunistic adoption of anti-takeover provisions, at least investors in IPO
firms are aware of the existence of anti-takeover charter provisions of the
company. They may choose to purchase the stock despite these provisions
because of the other overriding benefits. Also, the investors had an alternative
option to purchase other stock. By contrast, a typical corporate spin-off does
not have a public sale element and is not subject to any market pricing
mechanism at all.
More importantly, as the first public sale of stocks of a company, the IPO
means that a company that raises capital through the issuance of stock and its
management has a strong incentive to raise more money which will be a part
of the company’s assets. By contrast, a corporate spin-off does not involve
raising capital from new investors. Rather, it only divides a stock into more
pieces for existing shareholders. 36Accordingly management has little or no
33

See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 204-205 (1991).
34
See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm
Value?, Antitakeover Protection in IPO Firms, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83-120 ; Laura Casares
Field & Jonathan M Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1857–1889, 185
(2002). See also Michael Brennan & Julian Franks, Underpricing, Ownership and Control
in Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the U.K., 45 J. FIN. ECON. 391-414 (1997)
(claiming that managers opportunistically include anti-takeover provisions in the IPO
charters to secure their private benefits of control after the company goes public).
35
Some studies found that the use of anti-takeover provisions has no impact on the
subsequent likelihood of acquisition or takeover premium, which are powerful ways to
increase shareholder value. Rather, the findings show that those provisions that protect
managers were adopted mainly to preserve their private benefit of control, which suggests
agency problems in firms at the IPO stages. See Field & Karpoff, supra note 34, at 1884;
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713
(2003). By contrast, Daines & Klausner found that anti-takeover provision is used to protect
management when takeovers are most likely, but did not find evidence that supports
management's desire to protect high private benefits. See Daines & Klausner, Do IPO
Charters Maximize Firm Value?, supra note 34.
36
In other words, while an IPO decides how big the company’s size will be, a spin-off
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incentive to attract investors by providing the optimal terms and governance
structures, which makes spun-off companies more vulnerable to potential
managerial entrenchment. 37
2. No Ex-Ante Shareholder Approval Requirement
A spin-off has long been treated as a way of distributing a company’s
assets to its shareholders. 38 Just as with other dividends, the managers’
decision to declare a spin-off is protected as a business decision that does not
require shareholder approval. 39 Most state corporate laws as well as the
Model Business Corporation Act provide that directors have full discretion
to declare dividends without shareholder approval. 40 Only managers decide
whether, when, and how to pay dividends to shareholders and the
shareholders do not have a right to demand dividends. But whether this
managerial discretion extends to their freedom to decide all other details
associated with SpinCo, particularly SpinCo’s corporate governance
arrangements in its corporate charters, without shareholder approval remains
unsettled. If this were the case, it would be a huge exception to most state
corporate laws’ mandatory provisions requiring shareholder approval for
charter amendments. 41
Furthermore, given that both spin-offs and mergers are the same forms
of corporate reorganizations going in opposite directions, the waiver of
shareholder approval for spin-offs is more peculiar because mergers require

divides in smaller pieces without changing the sizes of the company.
37
One might argue that because a spun-off company is a stand-alone public company
and its shareholders’ subsequent sales of its stock can function as a monitoring mechanism.
However, profit from the subsequent sales is irrelevant to the company’s assets and is not
necessarily function as a monitoring mechanism for management.
38
Distribution of SpinCo' stock to ParentCo shareholders is neither cash dividend nor
stock dividend and a company’s charter provision on stock dividend does not apply. See In
re IAC/InterActive Corp. 948 A. 2d 471, 511 (Del. Ch. 2008).
39
For instance, Delaware General Corporation Act does not have a separate statutory
provision regarding spin-offs, let alone shareholder approval requirement. See John Savva &
Davis Wang, Spin-Offs: Frequently Asked Questions, DEAL LAWYERS (March-April 2016),
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/krautheimer-savva-wang-deal-lawyers-spinoffsfrequently-asked-questions-march-april-2016.pdf (“Under Delaware law, the generally
accepted view is that a spin-off is not a “sale, lease or exchange” of property or assets of the
parent that may implicate the requirement to obtain shareholder approval.”).
40
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 141, 170; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 12.01(4)
(explicitly providing that no shareholder approval is required “to distributes assets pro rata
to the holders of one or more classes or series of a corporation’s shares.” However, managers’
discretion in declaring dividends is subject to any restrictions in each company’s corporate
charters. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 12.01.
41
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 242.
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shareholder approval.42
C. Spin-off and Tax-Free Benefits
As we discussed in II.B above, a spin-off allows managers unparalleled
discretion and immunity under corporate law. In this Part, we now turn to tax
law to introduce the tax benefits that make a spin-off an even more attractive
choice to management.
1. Taxable Sale v. Tax-Free Spin-off
If the rationale for a spin-off is that it is advantageous to separate the
spun-off entity from the parent, a simpler way to achieve this result is for
ParentCo to sell the spin-off’s assets or stocks. Given that selling is simple,
why would management opt to pursue a spin-off strategy instead? The reason
lies in the tax consequences of the transaction. Assuming that the stock or
assets that would be separated from ParentCo appreciated in value while
ParentCo held them, such a sale would realize the built-in gain on such stock
or assets and thus ParentCo and its shareholders would be liable to pay taxes
on such gain.43 On the other hand, the distribution of the spun-off entity’s
stock to the parent’s shareholders as a spin-off division can be completed taxfree for both ParentCo and its shareholders, 44 as long as the transaction
satisfies the requirements set out in the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”),
which are explained in Subpart C.2. To be precise, the tax which would have
been imposed on the spin-off transaction becomes deferred until a subsequent
taxable event occurs—so the current spin-off is not subject to tax.45
In our pizza example, if A, B, C, and D order a pepperoni pizza and A
transfers his share – i.e., a quarter of pizza – to a third party, E, such transfer
is a sale of pizza and treated as a taxable event. On the other hand, if A, B, C,
42
Commentators have criticized that shareholder voting requirement in mergers is not
sufficient to prevent agency problem in governance changes during mergers due to “bundling”
issue. That is, when shareholders vote on a merger agreement, adoption of anti-takeover
provisions in a new company remains just a tiny part of the merger agreement. Even when
shareholders do not want an anti-takeover charter provision, it is usually not a viable option
for shareholders to reject a merger agreement solely for that reason. See Bebchuk and Kamar,
Bundling and Entrenchment, supra note 19. This agency problem only worsens when there
is no shareholder approval requirement—as in governance changes during spin-offs.
43
See WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 4.
44
Id. at 5.
45
Candace A. Ridgway, Corporate Separations, 776-4TH TAX MGMT. BNA U.S.
INCOME PORTF. (2017) [hereinafter BNA, Corporate Separations]. Alongside the sizable tax
benefits weighing in favor of a spin-off, a sale may also require due diligence, negotiation,
execution, higher risk, and regulatory approvals. A spin-off, however, is generally
accomplished on an “as is,” “where is” basis. Id.
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and D cut the whole pizza into four slices and have one slice each, or eight
slices and have two slices each, that situation is analogous to a spin-off. The
Code treats such slicing and distributing as tax-free. In other words, the Code
allows tax-free benefits for certain spin-off transactions only if such spin-off
is a mere change in corporate form – from a whole pizza into slices among
stakeholders. It could vary how many pieces would the pizza be sliced into
and how many slices would be allocated to A, B, C, and D. The Code’s
requirements for tax-free spin-offs, therefore, are to guarantee that the slices
are allocated proportionately among existing stakeholders.
The tax-free status of the spin-off becomes crucial in many transactions
aiming at separating corporate stock of assets. A notable example is Yahoo’s
recent spin-off saga. Yahoo! Inc. first planned a tax-free spin-off of its stake
in Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., a major Chinese e-commerce group.46 The
Alibaba stock price had increased substantially since Yahoo! acquired
Alibaba, such that Yahoo shareholders would have had to pay about $10
billion in capital gains taxes should it have disposed of its shares outright.
However, if the proposed deal had qualified for a tax-free spin-off, Yahoo!
shareholders would have saved that substantial tax liability. 47 The plan was
criticized, however, as undeserving of the tax-free benefit. This was because
Yahoo! planned not only to spin off its 284 million shares in Alibaba, worth
$32 billion,48 by putting them into a newly registered company called Aabaco,
but also planned to contribute its minor operating business to Aabaco so as
to plausibly meet the requirements of a tax-free transaction. 49 The IRS
declined to issue a private letter ruling on the proposed transaction, which
suggested that the agency did not want to bless the deal by issuing a ruling. 50
Yahoo!’s tax adviser, Skadden Arps, issued a legal opinion reaffirming that
the deal would be tax-free to the company and its shareholders. 51 However,
46

Brian Womack, Yahoo to Spin Off Alibaba Stake Tax-Free as Public Company,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0127/yahoo-unveils-tax-free-spinoff-of-its-holding-in-alibaba.
47
Victor Fleischer, Yahoo’s Spinoff Plan Could Be Risky Business, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/business/dealbook/yahoos-spinoff-plancould-be-risky-business.html.
48
Id. Other sources estimated the value of Alibaba shares at $40 billion or $23 billion.
See Womack, supra note 46; Hannah Kuchler et al., Tax Rebuff Clouds Yahoo Spin-off Plan,
FIN. TIMES (Sep. 8, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/907b671a-566c-11e5-a28b50226830d644, respectively.
49
The requirement at issue was a valid (non-tax) business purpose. Victor Fleischer,
Yahoo’s Tax-Free Spinoff Plan Parallels a Historic Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/business/dealbook/yahoos-tax-free-spinoff-planparallels-a-historic-case.html.
50
Fleischer, supra note 47.
51
Id.
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in response, the IRS issued Notice 2015-59, an administrative
pronouncement expressing its concern about what it saw as possibly
aggressive deals.52
Although the language was general, everyone understood the IRS
guidance was addressed to Yahoo!.53 Amid pressure from investors urging
the board to abandon the spin-off of the Alibaba stock, the company dropped
its former plan and instead introduced a new plan to spin off the company’s
core business (i.e., web and advertising business), leaving the Alibaba stock
and other assets as is in Yahoo!.54 However, the revised plan also had tax
risks because the IRS would have likely evaluated the “reverse spin-off” in
the same way it viewed the “forward spin-off” and denied it tax-free status.55
And the result was as expected. Observing that the IRS had strengthened its
position to curb aggressive tax-free spin-offs (as discussed with more details
in Part III.C.), the company finally dropped the spin-off plans after
concluding that both the forward and reverse spin-offs had the same tax risks.
In the end, Yahoo decided to sell the core business to Verizon
Communications, Inc, which, of course, is a taxable transaction. 56
2. Requirements for Tax-Free Benefits
Tax law offers tax-free treatment when it comes to corporate
reorganization, because it is inefficient to impose taxes on a transaction which
is a mere change in existing corporate form or a shuffle of corporate assets.
As shown in the pizza example, it holds true in corporate separation, such as
spin-offs. The Code distinguishes mere changes in corporate structure via
spin-off (distributing pizza slices) from cashing out a business sector (selling
52

I.R.S. Notice 2015-59, 2015-40 I.R.B. 459.
Fleischer, supra note 47.
54
Laura Davison, Yahoo Reconsiders Spinoff Plans as IRS Forms New Policies, DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA) (Dec. 4, 2015); Brian Womack, Yahoo Scraps Alibaba Spinoff Amid
Investor
Pressure,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Dec.
9,
2015),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article48785550.html.
Such
“reverse spin-off” might have produced a modest amount of tax, but $10 billions of Yahoo’s
potential tax liability on built-in gains on the Alibaba stock would not be taxed currently and
could further be deferred indefinitely. Fleischer, supra note 47.
55
Laura Davison, Yahoo's Reverse Spinoff Also Has Tax Risks; Will It Happen?, DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA) (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.bna.com/yahoos-reverse-spinoffn57982065029/; Laura Davison, Yahoo Expects Reverse Spinoff Will Be Taxable, DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA) (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.bna.com/yahoo-expects-reversen57982066892/.
56
Davison, supra note 54; Womack, supra note 54. Even after the core asset sale, Yahoo
still has to go through reorganization of its holdings in Yahoo Japan and Alibaba. Laura
Davison, Yahoo Still Has to Deal With Alibaba Assets After Core Sale, DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA) (Jul. 27, 2016).
53
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a slice), and treats the former as a non-taxable event for ParentCo and its
shareholders and the latter as a taxable transaction. This Subpart briefly
examines the relevant statutory requirements in Section 355 of the Code and
the judicially created requirements. 57
a. Statutory Requirements
There are four basic statutory requirements a spin-off must meet to
qualify as a tax-free division under Section 355: 1) control, 2) distribution, 3)
active trade or business, and 4) device limitation. 58
First, the parent may distribute only the stock of SpinCo that it “controls”
immediately before the distribution by owning at least 80% of the stock by
vote and number.59 Second, the parent generally must “distribute all” of the
stock of SpinCo that it controls. 60 Third, each of the surviving corporations
(i.e., both ParentCo and SpinCo) should be engaged in the conduct of an
active trade or business immediately after the division that was actively
conducted for the five-year period prior to the spin-off.61 The purpose of this
rule is to ensure the corporation is engaging in an active business rather than
“merely hold[ing] a package of investment assets” in an attempt to “bail out
corporate profits.” 62 Finally, a spin-off must not be used principally as a
“device” for the distribution of the earnings and profits of either ParentCo or
SpinCo.63 This limitation is also to prevent a spin-off from being part of a
57
WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 45; BNA, Corporate Separations, supra
note 45, at I.D.2.
58
Id. at I.D.2.
59
I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(A), (D), 368(c); see BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45,
at III.A, and II.B.1.
60
However, if ParentCo does not distribute all of the stock in SpinCo, it must be able to
explain to the IRS that its primary purpose for retaining the stock was not tax avoidance.
I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D)(ii); BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at III.C.
61
I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C), (b); M ARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 1130 (5th ed. 2014).
62
BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at VI.B. The regulations further explain
that an “active business” generally means the corporation itself performs the substantial
management and operational activities through its own employees. Treas. Reg. § 1.3553(b)(2)(iii).
63
See I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B). Determining what constitutes such a device is not clear,
and the definition depends on all the facts and circumstances. The regulations list factors that
indicate that a transaction is a “device” as well as factors that indicate a transaction is not a
“device.” The factors that indicate a transaction is a device include: 1) pro rata distribution;
2) subsequent sale or exchange of stock; and 3) the nature and use of assets. By contrast, the
factors that indicate a transaction is not a “device” include: 1) corporate business purpose; 2)
distributing corporation is publicly traded and widely held; and 3) distribution to domestic
shareholders. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2), (3); BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45,
at V.A.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346805

20

Insulation by Separation

[27-Feb-19

plan to bail out earnings and profits by selling stock or liquidating one of the
corporations.64
b. Judicial Requirements
In addition to the statutory requirements, three judicially-developed
requirements have emerged: 1) business purpose, 2) continuity of business
enterprise, and 3) continuity of (proprietary) interest. 65 They are subsequently
included in the Treasury Regulations. 66
First, a spin-off must be carried out in whole, or substantial part, for one
or more “business purposes,” and not solely for tax-avoidance reasons 67
Examples of valid business purposes for a spin-off are pursuing fit and focus,
cost savings, employee compensation, resolving shareholder conflicts, better
capital raising condition, and so on. 68
Second, both the parent and the spun-off entity are required to “continue
one of their businesses,” or to use a significant portion of their historic
business assets in a business post spin-off.69
Last but not least is the “continuity of proprietary (shareholder) interest”
requirement. One or more shareholders of ParentCo are required to own an
amount of stock establishing continuity of interest in each of the corporate
forms in which the enterprise is conducting business following the spin-off.70
The regulations do not specify a minimum required continuity. However, the
examples in the regulations indicate that 20% continuity is too little and 50%
continuity is adequate. 71
Those judicial requirements generally serve “substance over form”
purposes to prevent a corporation from cashing out an active business through
64

See MCMAHON, supra note 61, at 1149.
BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at II.
66
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b), -1(b), -2(c), respectively.
67
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1); BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at VIII.
“Business purpose” is defined as a real and substantial non-tax purpose germane to the
business of the parent, the spin-off, or an affiliated group. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2). There
is a relationship between the business purpose requirement and the device limitation such
that a strong business purpose for the spin-off may outweigh evidence that would otherwise
indicate the spin-off was used as a device. BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at
VIII.A.
68
Id. at VIII.C.1.–5; see also WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 3.
69
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(b). The continuity of business requirement has traditionally
been understood as the same requirement for other reorganizations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.3681(d)(1); BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at VII.B..
70
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1). It is included in the regulation to emphasize that the
continuity of interest is an independent test that must be met under Section 355.
71
See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(2) Ex. 1–4; BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45,
at VII.A.1.
65
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a spin-off transaction that has the same economic consequences as just selling
a business which would have been a taxable sale transaction. 72 To merit the
tax-free benefit, the substance of the transaction must consist of the mere
rearrangement of corporate assets in one or more continuing corporate
enterprises owned by the original owners.
However, what if the rights and role of the original owners, or those of
the parent’s shareholders, have changed significantly post spin-off?
Figuratively speaking, what if the pepperoni topping is allocated in a
significantly disproportionate fashion while slicing? The question might be
raised in the context of the continuity of interest requirement. The existing
rules only concern whether original shareholders receive an instrument
labeled “equity” and whether these original shareholders receive more than
the minimum percentage – i.e., about 50% – set out in the regulations. 73 The
rules do not consider the qualitative difference in stock due to governance
changes in the enterprises, such as voting rights changes occurred during the
spin-off.
In our pizza example, pizza slice is considered as equity and pepperoni
topping is considered as shareholder rights attached to the equity, such as
voting right. Current law only makes sure that the slices are the same size and
allocated fairly to the existing stakeholders—that is, original shareholders
should receive at least 50% of the slices to meet the continuity of interest
requirement. Current law, however, does not concern whether the pepperoni
topping is continued in original shareholders at a substantially similar level
after slice distribution. As long as original stakeholders receive the
substantially proportional number of the same-sized slices, it does not
consider the disproportionate distribution of topping among stakeholders
who receive the slices. However, is the pizza slice distribution that is
proportional in slice quantity but disproportional in topping quality a mere
change in form? Analogously, is a spin-off that distributes stock that is
qualitatively different from ParentCo stock due to the governance disparity
to original shareholders a mere change in form? Does such spin-off qualify
tax-free benefit? The answer under current law is positive. The authors,
however, argue that the rule should be revisited to reconsider the current
treatment. This problem will be revisited in Parts II.A.2 and II.C.2. after
exploring the governance disparity relating to spin-offs below.

72
Id. at II.E.1. The judicial requirements overlap considerably with the device limitation,
which patrols against prearranged post-distribution sales as part of its anti-bailout mission.”
STEPHEN SCHWARZ ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES TAXATION 921 (6th
ed. 2017).
73
Id.; Joshua D. Blank, Confronting Continuity: A Tradition of Fiction in Corporate
Reorganizations, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346805

22

Insulation by Separation

[27-Feb-19

D. Spin-offs as Joint Products of Corporate and Tax Laws
This Part examined how corporate spin-offs are entitled to special
treatment under both corporate law (i.e., no checking mechanisms) and tax
law (i.e., tax-free benefits). Spin-offs generally are initiated by strong
business goals, but the completion of spin-offs is often conditioned on
obtaining tax-free treatment of those spin-offs. As such, corporate law and
tax law considerations function as key elements among others for spin-off
transactions. In that light, neither corporate law nor tax law alone would be
sufficient to fully address problems arising from spin-offs and the first
cooperative analysis of corporate and tax law in this Article would provide a
holistic view to the problems we identify in the next chapter.
II.

MANAGEMENT INSULATION BY CORPORATE SEPARATION

As we have discussed in the previous Part, a corporate spin-off provides
a unique opportunity for managers to transform corporate governance
structures without shareholder approval or market checks. The fact that
ParentCo’s managers have full discretion in setting SpinCo’s governance
arrangement in its corporate charter brings us to the question of whether, and
if so to what extent, managers actually exercise the discretion. Having a right
is one thing, but exercising the right is another. When managers have
discretion free from shareholder approval, how do they use the discretion?
In practice, managers tend to proactively utilize the opportunity to adopt
governance choices that may limit shareholder power. Adoption of antitakeover charter provisions in SpinCo has been the most common form of
governance changes. Recently, along with the new phenomenon of dual-class
stock structure, the frequency of dual-class stock structure in SpinCo also has
increased. The potential risk of the unilateral reallocation of power is
significantly intensified when a spin-off is combined with a dual-class stock
structure in the sense that any change in voting rights is often times
irreversible, and thus perpetuates the unilateral allocation of control. In this
Part, we uncover how the combination of dual-class stock and spin-offs raises
not only a perceived risk but a real one by discussing a real-world example.
A. Spin-offs and Managers’ Unilateral Governance Changes
As we discussed above, most state corporate laws treat a spin-off as a
dividend to shareholders, which is within managers’ discretion. 74 Thus, the
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 170. (“Courts have consistently refused to
second-guess management’s decision on dividends holding that those decisions should be
deferred to business judgment protection. See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 3e83 N.Y.S.
74
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rationale for granting unfettered discretion to managers in making spin-offs
stems from the managerial discretion for dividends, which emphasizes
operational efficiency. Corporate law has consistently viewed managers’
decision on dividends as a business decision on the basis that dividends do
not change shareholder rights fundamentally. 75
In the recent practice of spin-offs, however, managers have been using
their discretionary power not only for a dividend decision but also to change
governance structure. For instance, during a spin-off, the managers of a
ParentCo can adopt provisions in a SpinCo’s corporate charter that
shareholders would likely reject if it were up for ParentCo shareholders’ vote
because those governance changes tend to give more power or protection to
management.76
1. Corporate Law Considerations of Unilateral Governance Changes
In 2012, ConocoPhillips spun off from its downstream businesses under
a new independent company named Phillips 66. At that time, the spun-off
company was worth about $34.5 billion, consisting of roughly 28%, in terms
of the market capitalization, of the parent company. 77 As one of the largest
public companies itself, Phillips 66 was not necessarily vulnerable to a hostile
takeover attempt, but its corporate charter implemented a staggered board
provision on top of other provisions modeled after the parent company’s
charter provisions.78
The adoption of a staggered board, however, went in the opposite
2d 807, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
75
Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
847 (2005) (“Corporate law does not view decisions about distributions, however
economically important, as involving the kind of fundamental change that calls for
shareholder veto power. Rather, such decisions are viewed as part of the ordinary conduct of
business delegated to the sole prerogative of management.”).
76
Empirical data shows the frequent use of antitakeover provisions in spun-off
companies. See supra note 4. This practice remains consistent with guidance provided in
client letters generated by law firms. See, e.g., Francis J. Aquila, Key Issues When
Considering
a
Spin-off
(Jun.
2015),
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/June15_InTheBoardroom.pdf (“Putting takeover
defenses (such as establishing a classified board…) in the subsidiary’s charter or by-laws
puts the subsidiary’s board in a better negotiating position against a potential acquirer,
allowing directors to protect the interests of the shareholders by fending off unfair or
undesirable bids.”).
77
Christopher Helman, As ConocoPhillips Spins Off Refining Assets, Think Twice
Before
Buying
the
New
Phillips
66,
FORBES
(Apr.
30,
2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/04/30/as-conocophillips-spins-offrefining-assets-should-you-own-the-new-phillips-66/.
78
AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF PHILLIPS 66, Article
Fifth.
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direction of the recent movement of eliminating such structure from corporate
charters on shareholders’ request. A staggered board has long been regarded
as one of the most effective anti-takeover provisions that insulates
management from shareholder intervention. 79 Similar to U.S. senators’
staggered elections, when a company staggers its board, only one third of
directors are elected each year and the directors cannot be removed without
cause. 80 This tactic can delay a hostile insurgent’s attempt to replace the
directors up to three years at its maximum. 81 The management of
ConocoPhillips did not even need to persuade shareholders to adopt this
controversial staggered board structure because it emerged through the spinoff process without shareholder approval.
As such, the current practice of managers’ unilateral governance changes
in the course of spin-offs is inconsistent with corporate law’s implicit
assumption for spin-offs: no fundamental changes to the company before and
after the spin-off. Adopting an anti-takeover charter provision is a common
way for ParentCo’s managers to change governance arrangements. If
ParenCo’s managers add a new provision affecting the allocation of power
between shareholders and managers into a SpinCo’s charter, the change is
not a mere distribution anymore. Accordingly, the assumption for a spin-off
that there are no fundamental changes before and after the spin-off is broken
when the spin-off introduces governance change.
Empirical data supports the prevalence of anti-takeover provisions in
SpinCo.82 On why SpinCo tends to have more anti-takeover provisions than
ParentCo, two competing hypotheses have existed. 83 First, the “entrenchment
hypothesis” argues that ParentCo’s managers adopt antitakeover provisions
in SpinCo when those provisions would extract more of their private benefit
out of the entrenchment. 84 Alternatively, the “efficiency hypothesis” claims
79

For the discussion of antitakeover effect of staggered board structure, see, e.g., Lucian
Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence,
and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002). Recent study finds that a staggered board’s effect
on firm value vary depending on each company’s unique characteristics. Yakov Amihud,
Markus Schmid, and Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling the Staggered Board Debate, 166
U. PA. L. REV. 1475 (2018) (“The effect of a staggered board is idiosyncratic; for some firms
it increases value, while for other firms it is value-destroying.”).
80
For a default structure of staggered boards, see, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 141(b).
81
If a company’s charter or bylaws gives shareholders the right to call a “special meeting”
or to act by “written consent” between annual meetings, hostile insurgent can replace the
entire members on the staggered board in less than three years.
82
See Daines & Klausner, Agents Protecting Agents, supra note 4, at 22-23.
83
For the detailed development and empirical tests of the two hypotheses, see Daines &
Klausner, Agents Protecting Agents, supra note 4, at 13-15.
84
Daines & Klaunser’s empirical finding supports the “Entrenchment Hypothesis.”
(“[T]hese results are consistent with the proposition that the takeover defenses are adopted
out of entrenching, rather than share value-maximization, motivations.”) Daines & Klaunser,
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that ParentCo’s managers adopt new antitakeover protections in SpinCo to
enhance shareholder value. For instance, when SpinCo is much smaller than
the previously combined company and thus more vulnerable to hostile
takeover attempts, antitakeover provisions may protect from those attempts
or at least increase SpinCo’s bargaining power for the better price. 85
The purpose of this Article is not to claim that an additional anti-takeover
provision in SpinCo itself is necessarily entrenching or efficient. This is
because both the incentives of managers and the effects of an anti-takeover
provision may vary depending on each company’s unique situation. Instead,
this Article focuses on the procedural loophole where governance changes
are made during spin-offs. The current regime grants managers unfettered
freedom for governance changes in the course of spin-offs, and managers
have been actively exercising discretion in choosing more anti-takeover
provisions.
The concern about managers’ unilateral governance changes in spin-offs
is still valid but with different weights under entrenchment and efficiency
hypotheses on the prevalence of on why SpinCo has more antitakeover
provisions than its ParentCo. First, if ParentCo’s managers adopt
antitakeover provisions in furtherance of their entrenchment (as under the
“entrenchment hypothesis”), it is palpable that the lack of a monitoring
mechanism for governance changes over spin-offs would facilitate the
managers’ opportunistic governance changes and thus increases agency costs
out of the entrenchment. For instance, entrenching managers would have
ample incentives to take advantage of this procedural loophole to adopt a
charter provision that protects them from shareholder intervention even
further.
Second, even when managers implement anti-takeover provisions in
SpinCo to advance shareholder value (as argued in the “efficiency
hypothesis”), this legitimate incentive does not necessarily justify the
elimination of a checking mechanism for introducing the anti-takeover
provisions in SpinCo charter. This is largely because of the rigidity of
corporate charters. State corporate laws require mutual consent between
managers and shareholders to amend corporate charters and neither
shareholders nor managers cannot change corporate charters unilaterally. 86
Thus, once ParentCo managers implement an anti-takeover provision in
SpinCo’s charter, shareholders cannot take it off without managers’ consent.
Agents Protecting Agents, supra note 4, at 21.
85
See WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 22-23. This rationale, however, is
not compelling for the recent trend of spin-offs dividing a ParentCo into two companies of
comparable sizes as occurred with Motorola, Hewlett Packard, Tyco, and DowDuPont. See
id.
86
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2014).
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Because the efficiency of anti-takeover provisions is volatile as the
company’s other features evolve (e.g., ownership structure, company age, or
company size), an efficient anti-takeover provision at the time of the adoption
is not necessarily efficient ten years after the adoption. Also, because all antitakeover provisions inherently have a self-serving element to managers by
securing their tenure on the board, the adoption of an “efficient-for-now”
anti-takeover provision is always vulnerable to managerial entrenchment.
Thus, a shareholder approval requirement may still function as a useful
checking process even for adoption of efficient charter provisions to
maximize shareholder value.
Furthermore, in other contexts of corporate law including mergers,
shareholder approval is necessary for managers to change corporate charter
provisions regardless the efficiency of the provision at the time of the
adoption. When it comes to fundamental changes such as governance
changes through corporate charters, shareholders are given a chance to voice
themselves on the issue. In that sense, the current procedural loophole in spinoffs, which enables managers’ unilateral changes, make the use of efficient
anti-takeover provision less desirable because it inadvertently intensifies the
risk of managerial entrenchment.
2. Tax Considerations of Unilateral Governance Changes
Setting aside the corporate law consequences, let us consider the tax
consequences from a policy perspective. Allowing tax-free benefits to spinoffs encompassing significant governance changes is not a good tax policy.
It is inefficient and unfair for the following reasons.
First, current tax law treatment of spin-offs is inefficient because it may
encourage certain spin-off transactions that are not mere changes in form.
The rationale for the tax-free benefits for reorganization transactions is to
support such reorganization that would transform the business structure into
more efficient one. As long as such a transformation is a mere change in form
that is economically equivalent before and after the fact, it is worth
facilitating it by deferring tax liability on the built-in gain in the business.
Thus, it is critical that the reorganization represents merely a change in form
and does not entail any change in substance.
However, contemporary spin-offs are not simply used to reorganize
corporate structures. There are many examples showing that a spin-off is a
convenient way not only to slice off a profitable sector from ParentCo but
also to create the corporate structure of SpinCo completely different from
ParentCo without shareholders’ consent. And the resulting new corporate
governance structure benefits managers, not shareholders.
Tax law, then, should not encourage such analogous spin-offs at least.
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Nonetheless, current tax law ignores the potential risk of governance change
in spin-offs and offers tax benefits as long as the transaction technically
satisfies the outdated requirements that only consider the quantity of the
continued equity. This encourages such deviant spin-offs that would not be
executed had it incurred a risk of triggering tax liability on the built-in gains.
Such behavioral distortion has nothing to do with correcting market failure
on corporate reorganizations. Rather, it promotes the market manipulation on
corporate reorganizations by managers by lifting a regulatory hurdle, called
tax.
Second, current tax law treatment of spin-offs is unfair because it treats
two different types of spin-offs the same and allow tax free benefits to both.
Without the special tax provisions for reorganizations, the reorganization
transaction should be considered as a taxable event. However, tax law
specially offers tax-free benefits to certain type of reorganizations that are
mere changes in form. Thus, given the rationale of tax-free benefits for
reorganization, tax treatment should be different between the reorganization
transactions that are mere changes in form and that of reorganization
transactions that are changes in substance. Tax free benefits should only be
allowed to the former and not to the latter.
Nonetheless, current law does not distinguish the two and rather treats
them the same. It ignores the potential risk of governance changes in spinoffs and offers tax benefits to those spin-offs that might be changes in
substance. It is the violation of horizontal equity that demands the equal
treatment for taxpayers in equal situations and the different treatment for
taxpayers in different situations.
Another criterion to consider in tax policy analysis is administrability.
Current law might be simpler than the proposed approach that distinguishes
spin-offs that are mere changes in form from those that are not. 87 A long and
detailed statute may result in compliance complexity, but if it gives a very
specific solution to a problem, that feature can reduce rule complexity and
can make things simpler overall. It also may contribute to more efficient and
equitable result.
B. Spin-offs and Dual-Class Stock
The agency problems arising out of the managers’ unilateral governance
87
The third prong for tax policy analysis is complexity. David Bradford categorizes
complexity into three different categories – i) compliance complexity (the cost taxpayers has
to pay to comply the rule), ii) rule complexity (the difficulty to understand what the law is),
and iii) transactional complexity (complexity that arises from taxpayers organizing their
affairs to minimize taxes). DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266-67
(1986).
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changes described above can significantly be compounded when ParentCo’s
managers adopt a dual-class stock structure in SpinCo without shareholder
approval. Dual-class stock structure, which allocates varying voting rights
(e.g., high-vote and low-vote) to different classes of common stockholders,
is an extremely effective form of governance choice that separates ownership
from control. Academic literature evaluating spin-offs and dual-class stock
respectively have developed, and no prior studies have analyzed an
interaction between spin-offs and dual-class stock. The scarcity of studies
may be largely because both have not been prevalent until recent years. 88
Given that both spin-offs and dual-class stock have been surging recently,
however, it is crucial to understand how the interaction between spin-offs and
dual-class stock can affect the corporate governance landscape.
1. Dual-Class Stock as a Separator of Ownership and Control among
Shareholders
Among various charter and bylaw provisions that may affect shareholder
rights, a dual-class stock structure is one of the most effective mechanisms
for keeping control within a small number of insiders. Dual-class stock
enables high-vote stockholders to dominate all shareholder voting agendas,
from annual director elections to M&A approvals. Typically, dual-class stock
limits the transfer of high-vote stock by means of neutralizing higher voting
rights when the stock is transferred to non-initial holders. In that way, the
high-vote stock can remain only in hands of the initial holders.
Dual-class capital structures are sometimes used not because of concerns
about short-term market pressure and takeover threats but to achieve tax or
other transaction planning objectives. For example, when a parent company
decides to spin off a subsidiary, it often also decides to raise capital before
the spin-off by causing the subsidiary to engage in an IPO. If the parent
company maintains at least 80% of the voting power in the subsidiary
following the IPO, the subsequent spin-off receives tax-free treatment.
Raising large amounts of capital, however, may require the parent company
to sell more than 20% of the subsidiary’s common stock. The dual-class
structure offers a solution. The parent company can create a dual-class
structure in the subsidiary, then sell low-vote stock to the public in the IPO,
and retain the high-vote stock. This practice allows the parent company to
sell as much stock as necessary to raise capital while still maintaining 80%
of the voting power in the subsidiary to realize tax benefits. In the Zoetis IPO
in January 2018, Pfizer used the dual-class structure to raise $2.2 billion in
Dains & Klusner, Agents Protecting Agents, supra note 4, at 12 (“Dual-class stock is
more entrenching but not common.”).
88
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the IPO while maintaining 98% of the voting power in Zoetis and preserving
the flexibility to conduct a tax-free spin-off at a later stage. 89
Dual-class stock structure has become one of the most heavily debated
issues in corporate governance, and the debate is still far from over.90 While
dual-class stock itself has been subject to regulation on and off for several
decades,91 the recent debate over its desirability was sparked when Google
(now Alphabet) adopted unequal voting rights at its IPO in 2004. 92 The
debate was inflamed when Snap, Inc.’s founders offered only non-voting
stock to the public in its IPO in 2017. 93 The dual-class stock has been
commonly used for founders, as holders of higher votes per share, to retain
control over the company without corresponding economic risk. 94
Proponents of dual-class stock offer arguments rooted in the traditional
corporate law approach to governance that values each company’s flexibility
to choose the rules that best suits its needs, including dual-class stock
structure. 95 For certain companies—young tech firms, for instance—
89
Stephen I. Glover & Aarthy S. Thamodaran, Debating Pros and Cons of Dual-class
Capital
Structures,
27
Insights
Volume
(Mar.
2013)
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/GloverThamodaranDualClassCapitalStructures.pdf.
90
For a comprehensive review of the debate, see generally Dorothy Lund, Nonvoting
Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, STAN. L. R.(forthcoming) (2019).
91
Dual-class stock dates back to 1920s. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in
Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 687, 693–97 (1985); Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to
SEC Rule 19c-4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 982 (1989); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L.
REV. 585, 596 (2017).
92
The ratio of voting rights per share for each class of Google common stock is Class A
(1): Class B (10): Class C (0).
93
Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-planevan-spiegel.html.
94
See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 YALE L. J. 560, 563 (2016).
95
See David J. Berger, Dual-Class Stock and Private Ordering: A System That Works,
HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION
(May 24, 2007), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/24/dual-class-stock-and-privateordering-a-system-that-works/#more-90363 (“[W]e believe that the present system of
private ordering with respect to dual-class stock will—and should—continue. Private
ordering allows boards, investors, and other corporate stakeholders to determine the most
appropriate capital structure for a particular company, given its specific needs.”); The
Promise of Market Reform: Reigniting America’s Economic Engine, NASDAQ (2017),
https://business.nasdaq.com/media/Nasdaq_Blueprint_to_Revitalize_Capital_Markets_Apr
il_2018_tcm5044-43175.pdf (“Each publicly-traded company should have flexibility to
determine a class structure that is most appropriate and beneficial for them, so long as this
structure is transparent and disclosed up-front so that investors have complete visibility into
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founders benefit from the insulation that dual-class stock provides from shortterm market pressure because it enables the founders to pursue their longterm vision, which may increase shareholder value in the long run. 96
Opponents of dual-class stock, on the other hand, raise concerns about how
the structure could exacerbate agency costs based on the traditional
perspective regarding the private benefit of control. 97 They argue that, since
controllers’ economic benefit may be less aligned with stock value, they
would find it more beneficial to extract private benefit using their control
rather than to improve firm value. Early empirical studies suggested that
companies with dual-class stock are more likely to reduce shareholder
value.98 As a more practical solution, some opponents propose limiting the
duration of the voting power differential under a dual-class system. 99 They
argue that sunset provisions, which fix a dual-class stock’s expiration date,
should be included to balance costs and benefits of dual-class stock because
potential benefits of dual-class stock decrease as time passes and thus are
likely to be outweighed by potential costs. 100
Both proponents and opponents of the debate, however, pay little
attention to the further possibility that managers can unilaterally rearrange
the company.”).
96
See generally Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder
Value, 8 HARV. BUS. LAW REV. 53 (2018); Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private Ordering
Defense of a Company's Right to Use Dual-class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV.
(2018) (“Once we start thinking in terms of minimizing total control costs, it becomes easier
to accept that allowing for the private benefits of control associated with dual-class share
structures may actually be a contributing factor to the long-term value of the firm.”).
97
On July 21, 2016, thirteen high profile executives and investment managers declared
that a “[d]ual class voting is not a best practice.” COMMONSENSE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 5 (2016).
98
See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 91, at 603 (“Paul Gompers … studying U.S. dualclass companies over 1995-2002, found evidence that these companies exhibited increased
agency costs and reduced value.”); Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An
Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1051-54 (2010);
Ronald W. Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1722
(2009) (“Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that insiders holding more voting
rights relative to cash flow rights extract more private benefits at the expense of outside
shareholders.”); Blair Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann
LLP, Dual-Class: The Consequences of Depriving Institutional Investors of Corporate
Voting Rights, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND F. REG. (May 17, 2007),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/24/dual-class-stock-and-private-ordering-asystem-that-works/#more-90363 (“[s]uch structures reduce oversight by, and accountability
to, the actual majority owners of the company. They hamper the ability of boards of directors
to execute their fiduciary duties to shareholders. And they can incentivize managers to act in
their own interests, instead of acting in the interest of the company’s owners.”).
99
See generally Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 91.
100
Id.
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the initial allocation of voting rights through spin-offs. The costs from this
possibility should be considered in evaluating the advantages and
disadvantages of dual-class stock. This Article contributes to the current
debate on the desirability of dual-class stock by providing a necessary but
little-known perspective to evaluate dual-class stock.
2. Spin-off as a Waiver to Current Restrictions on Dual-Class Stock
Due to dual-class stock structure’s power to perpetuate the disparity of
ownership and control, adoption of dual-class stock without shareholder
approval significantly intensifies potential agency costs discussed in the
earlier section of this paper. 101 Adoption of dual-class stock also circumvents
major stock exchange rules prohibiting a midstream conversion from singleclass to dual-class stock structure. Since the current major stock exchange
rules prohibit dual-class recapitalization (i.e., switching to dual-class stock
midstream), listed companies can adopt dual-class stock only when they issue
their stock to the public for the first time via initial public offering (“IPO”). 102
During the IPO process, the perception of the value of the dual-class stock
will be reflected in the price of the securities issued. Once the company has
gone public, market participants will be able to make their own decision
about whether they find the dual-class stock acceptable. In spin-offs, by
contrast, shareholders have no opportunity to veto managers’ adoption of
dual-class stock to a spin-off company even when it may significantly dilute
their voting rights.
C. Aggravating Effects of Spin-off and Dual-Class Stock
So far, we have analyzed how the new practice of dual-class stock
structure in a spun-off company may increase agency costs at a theoretical
level. This Subpart presents a real-world example that demonstrates how
shareholder voting rights can be distorted by dual-class stock adopted in a
SpinCo. While anti-takeover provisions in a SpinCo charter are much more
troubling when managers add a new provision that does not exist in a
ParentCo charter without shareholder approval, the existence of dual-class
stock structure in SpinCo itself has a power to significantly change the
allocation of power within the company, notwithstanding the extremity of the
case where managers newly adopt dual-class stock structure in SpinCo
without shareholder consent.103
101

See supra Part II.A.
See NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 313.00 (1992); NASDAQ Stock Market
Rule 5640.
103
On the context of anti-takeover provisions, Daines & Klausner call this type of
102
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1. Corporate Law: Reallocation of Voting Rights
In 2017, NACCO Industries (“ParentCo”) spun off its home appliances
and commercial restaurant equipment business under the name of Hamilton
Beach Brand Holding Company (HBB, “SpinCo”). In the process of
separation, the SpinCo took a significant majority of the ParentCo’s revenue.
ParentCo’s CEO resigned his role as CEO of ParentCo and became the
executive chairman of SpinCo. 104 This was another case where the SpinCo
took the lion’s share.
The SpinCo’s charter was largely modeled after the ParentCo’s charter,
including a dual-class stock structure. Because the ParentCo already was
structured as dual-class stock, some may argue that the SpinCo’s dual-class
stock was not a surprise to the ParentCo shareholders, and thus the risk of
voting right distortion before and after the spin-off was low. The
NACCO/HBB spin-off, however, presents a vivid example showing how the
existence of dual-class stock in the SpinCo itself can facilitate managerdriven governance changes while retaining the voting rights gap between
high-votes and low-votes stockholders—all without shareholder approval.
a.

Allocation of Voting Rights in ParentCo Before the Spin-off

NACCO Industries, the ParentCo, has had a dual-class structure since its
incorporation in 1987. The arrangement gives one vote per share for Class A
Common stockholders and ten votes per share for Class B Common
stockholders.105 As of 2017, NACCO’s dual-class stock structure enabled the
high-vote Class B stockholders to exercise 75% of voting rights despite their
ownership of only 23% of the company stock. By contrast, while the lowvote Class A stockholders hold 77% of economic interests, their collective
voting rights were only 23%, which was far below the 50% threshold. Table
2 below shows this disparity between stock ownership and voting rights prior
to the spin-off using simplified numbers/ratio of actual ones. The disparity
charter amendment as a “back door charter amendment.” See Daines & Klausner, Agents
Protecting Agents, supra note 4, at 22. (claiming that ParentCo managers inclusion of antitakeover provision in their SpinCo charter when the ParentCo’s own charters do not have
those anti-takeover provisions would in effect, amend the SpinCo charter without
shareholder consent and finding that “such back-door amendments commonly occur.”).
104
Hamilton Beach Brand Holding Company, Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 4
(Aug. 21, 2017). See also George Joshman, Everything But the Kitchen Sink-NACCO to Spin
Off Hamilton Beach Kitchen Appliance Division, Stock Spinoffs (Aug. 23, 2017)
https://www.stockspinoffs.com/2017/08/23/everything-kitchen-sink-nacco-spin-offhamilton-beach-kitchen-appliance-division/.
105
RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF NACCO INDUSTRIES, INC., Article
Fourth. 3 (a) (Mar. 31, 1993).
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between ownership and voting rights may not be bad per se, but it makes the
company more susceptible to the agency problem with the high-vote holders,
mostly corporate insiders including founding family members. 106
Table 2. Pre-Spin-off: NACCO Stock Ownership and Voting Rights 107
Number
Stock
NACCO

of
in

% of Equity
Ownership in
NACCO

Number
Votes in
NACCO

of

% of Voting
Right
in
NACCO

NACCO Class A
(1 vote/share)

250

77%

250
(250x1)

25%

NACCO Class B
(10 votes/share)

75

23%

750
(75x10)

75%

Total

325

100%

1,000

100%

Moreover, the ParentCo had a charter provision on the equal distribution
requirement in dividends preventing the reallocation of voting rights that may
arise from stock dividends. 108 The ParentCo’s charter provision on dividends
stipulates that its low-vote Class A and high-vote Class B common stock have
equal rights to stock dividends as long as each class receives the same class
of stock as a dividend when it comes to the distribution of the company’s
stock. 109 When the company distributes cash, stock, or property of the
106

See supra Part I.B.1.
The numbers in the Tables 2-4 are simplified forms of the actual numbers/ratio
disclosed in the SEC filings. See NACCO Industries, Proxy Material for the 2017 shareholder
meeting. (“Stockholders of record at the close of business on March 20, 2017 will be entitled
to notice of, and to vote at, the Annual Meeting. On that date, we had 5,260,048 outstanding
shares of Class A Common Stock, par value $1.00 per share ("Class A Common"), entitled
to vote at the Annual Meeting and 1,570,815 outstanding shares of Class B Common Stock,
par value $1.00 per share ("Class B Common"), entitled to vote at the Annual Meeting.”).
108
RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF NACCO INDUSTRIES, INC., Article
Fourth. 6. (Mar. 31, 1993).
109
Id. The full text of the charter provision is as follows:
[E]ach share of Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock shall be equal
in respect of rights to dividends and other distributions in cash, stock or property of
the Corporation, provided that in the case of dividends or other distributions payable
in stock of the Corporation, including distributions pursuant to stock split-ups or
divisions of stock of the Corporation, which occur after the date shares of Class B
Common Stock are first issued by the Corporation, only shares of Class A Common
Stock shall be distributed with respect to Class A Common Stock and only shares
of Class B Common Stock shall be distributed with respect to Class B Common
Stock.
107
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company, the company has to make an equal distribution to both Class A and
Class B common stock in proportion to the amount of stock owned. If the
company declares a dividend for only one class of stock or makes different
types or amounts of dividends, it would violate the charter provision.110 The
only exception applies when the company distributes the company’s own
stock. In other words, the charter requires that Class A and Class B
stockholders should receive the identical class of stock as dividends
respectively: Class A stockholders receive Class A stock only, and Class B
stockholders receive Class B stock only as dividends.
However, the charter provision has been silent on the distribution of its
subsidiary’s stock, which is a common mechanism of a spin-off. In spin-offs,
what ParentCo distributes is not the company’s own stock but its subsidiary
company (i.e., SpinCo)’s stock, which is a part of ParentCo’s assets.111 Due
to this silence, when ParentCo spin-offs a subsidiary, its Class A and Class B
stock classes are both entitled to receive the equal distribution of subsidiary
stock. Specifically in the NACCO/HBB spin-off, the ParentCo’s low-vote
Class A stockholders and high-vote Class B stockholders have equal rights
to the distribution of the SpinCo’s stock and thus the ParentCo was required
to distribute one share of the SpinCo Class A common stock and one share
of SpinCo Class B common stock to each stock of the ParentCo as dividends
in proportion to the total number of ParentCo stock they own.112
Due to this equal distribution provision, NACCO’s subsequent spin-offs
would incrementally dilute the high-vote Class B stockholders’ voting rights.
The corporate insiders who were managers and held most of the high-vote
Class B stock in NACCO were in need of preventing a further dilution of
voting rights during spin-offs. Instead of going through a charter amendment
process that requires shareholder approval, the managers of NACCO took
advantage of occasion of the spin-off to amend the charter provision without
shareholder consent. 113

110

Alternatively, other companies may provide an option for shareholders to receive
dividends either in cash or in stock. But this option has not been prevalent because it rejects
tax-free benefit for the distribution under the tax code. See I.R.C. § 305(b)(1).
111
The court distinguishes a distribution of a company’s own stock and a distribution of
a subsidiary’s stock. See, e.g., In re IAC/InterActive Corp (Del. Ch. 2008).
112
See Hamilton Beach Brand Holding Company, Registration Statement (Form S-1) at
37. (Aug. 21, 2017).
113
In a company with a dual-class structure, managers tend to be under the influence of
high-vote class stockholders such as founders of the company. Thus, while technically
ParentCo’s managers are the ones who set SpinCo’s governance arrangement, the direction
of change aligns with the interest of high-vote class stockholders in most cases.
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Nominal Change in Voting Rights Allocation After Spin-off

What managers claimed, however, in the new SpinCo’s registration
statement does not seem to benefit ParentCo’s high-vote stockholders and
managers. On the contrary, managers claimed that the equal distribution
requirement in ParentCo charter would reverse the proportional interest that
ParentCo’s shareholders will have in SpinCo, and thus ParentCo’s high-vote
stockholders will hold minority voting powers in SpinCo, while ParentCo’s
low-vote stockholders will hold majority voting powers in SpinCo.
Table 3 below, using simplified numbers/ratio of the actual ones/ratio of
the actual ones, explains the argument by the managers. ParentCo’s low-vote
Class A stockholders previously had 250 shares in ParentCo, representing 25%
voting rights in ParentCo as shown in Table 2 above. Due to the equal stock
distribution requirement for spin-offs, ParentCo Class A stockholders receive
250 Class A shares and 250 Class B shares in SpinCo. Because SpinCo also
has a dual-class stock structure, SpinCo’s low-vote Class A stock gets one
vote per share, and SpinCo’s high-vote Class B stock gets ten votes per share.
Consequently, ParentCo’s low-vote Class A stockholders’ total voting rights
in SpinCo would be 2750 (=250x1+250x10), representing 77% of the votes
in SpinCo. In the same way, ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stockholders’
voting rights in SpinCo is 825 (=75x1+72x10), representing 23% of the votes
in SpinCo.
In sum, the low-vote Class A stockholders in ParentCo, representing only
25% voting rights in ParentCo, will control 77% of the votes in SpinCo
(=2750/(2750+825)), whereas high-vote Class B stockholders in ParentCo,
representing 75% voting rights in ParentCo, will control only 23% of voting
right in SpinCo.
TABLE 3. POST-SPIN-OFF: CHANGES BASED ON MANAGERS’ CALCULATION114

NACCO
Class A
(1 vote/share)
NACCO
Class B
(10 votes/share)
Total

114

Number
of
NACCO
Stock
250

% of
Post-Spinoff
HBB Votes
77%

% of
NACCO
Stock

Number of
Post-Spin-off
HBB Stock

Number of
Post-Spin-off
HBB Votes

77%

500
(250A+250B)

2750
(250x1+250x10)

75

23%

150
(75A+75B)

825
(75x1+75x10)

23%

325

100%

650

3575

100%

Id.
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c. High-to-Low Conversion and Actual Changes in Voting Right Allocation
At first glance, as ParentCo managers argued, this reversal of the voting
rights between low-vote and high-vote class shareholders seems to be
desirable. This is because it looks like the insiders holding high-vote stock in
ParentCo now yield their majority voting power to low-vote stockholders,
and thus the disparity between ownership and voting control is attenuated. 115
However, the reversal of the voting power is not as apparent as it looks. This
is because of the SpinCo’s post-spin-off conversion provision in the charter.
While the post-spin-off allocation of voting rights in SpinCo shown in Table
3 above is not factually inaccurate, the allocation is temporary and misleading
because of a charter provision on high-to-low conversion for transfer.
Both the ParentCo’s and SpinCo’s high-vote Class B common stock are
not listed on stock exchanges. Only their low-vote Class A common stock are
publicly tradable on the New York Stock Exchange.116 For those who want
to trade their high-vote Class B stock, only two options are available. First,
they can transfer their high-vote stock only to or among the “Permitted
Transferees,” who are closely related to the high-vote Class B stockholders
as defined in the charter.117 The violation of this restriction of transfer would
automatically convert the high-vote Class B stock into low-vote Class A
stock.118 Second, they can convert their high-vote Class B stock into the lowvote Class A stock on a share-for-share basis. They can then transfer lowvote Class A stock on the stock exchange.119 In either case, the high-vote
Class B stock converts into the low-vote Class A stock on transfer, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, if the fellow high-vote Class B stockholders do
not agree to that transfer. The result is that the transferor’s voting rights in
SpinCo will be reduced from ten votes to one vote per share.
Who, then, holds the high-vote Class B stock in SpinCo? Due to the equal
distribution requirement in ParentCo’s charter, not only high-vote Class B
stockholders in ParentCo but also low-vote Class A stockholders in ParentCo
Id. at 4. (“By virtue of the spin off, there will be a greater concentration of voting
power in Hamilton Beach Holding among the holders of NACCO Class A Common than
such holders have in NACCO and a corresponding reduction in the concentration of voting
power in Hamilton Beach Holding among the holders of NACCO Class B Common.”).
116
Id. at 4. (“Like the NACCO [the ParentCo] Class B Common, our [the SpinCo’s]
Class B Common will not be listed on the NYSE or any other stock exchange, and we do not
expect any trading market for our Class B Common to exist.”).
117
Hamilton Beach, Corporate Charter Article 4. Section 3. 4. (a) (i).
118
Id.
119
Hamilton Beach, Registration Statement, at 4. (“If you want to sell the equity interest
represented by your shares of our Class B Common, you may convert those shares into an
equal number of shares of our Class A Common at any time, without cost, and then sell your
shares of our Class A Common.”).
115

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346805

27-Feb-19]

Insulation by Separation

37

received high-vote Class B stock in SpinCo.120 Most of ParentCo’s low-vote
Class A stockholders, however, tend to be more interested in the investment
from trading rather than the control of the company. They must inevitably
convert their high-vote Class B stock in SpinCo into low-vote Class A stock
in SpinCo for transferability, despite the reduction in voting rights. By
comparison, the insiders who initially were holding ParentCo’s high-vote
Class B stock and were not as interested in trading as outside investors have
an incentive to retain SpinCo’s high-vote Class B stock.
If we reflect this conversion issue and assume that most of the high-vote
Class B stock in SpinCo is owned by insiders (i.e., initial holders of
ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stock), the allocation of voting rights between
Class A and Class B stockholders in SpinCo would be significantly different
from what the managers described in SpinCo’s registration statement. The
ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stockholders, who used to have 75% voting
rights in ParentCo in Table 2, still retain up to 62% voting rights in SpinCo,
which is more than majority.
TABLE 4. POST SPIN-OFF & CONVERSION: ACTUAL REALLOCATION OF VOTING
RIGHTS

NACCO
Class A
(1 vote/share)
NACCO
Class B
(10 votes/share)
Total

Number
of
NACCO
Stock
250

%
of
NACCO
Stock

Number of
Post-Spin-off
HBB Stock

Number of
Post-Spin-off
HBB Votes

% of
Post-Spin-off
HBB Votes

77%

500
(250A+250A)

500
(250x1+250x1)

38%

75

23%

150
(75A+75B)

825
(75x1+75x10)

62%

325

100%

650

1,325

100%

In other words, assuming that all high-vote Class B stock of SpinCo held
by non-insiders converted to the low-vote Class A stock of SpinCo for the
transferability, the ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stockholders may enjoy
possibly up to 62% voting rights in SpinCo as shown in Table 4, with only
23% of equity interests in the company. In contrast, ParentCo’s low-vote
Class A stockholders, who used to have 25% voting rights in ParentCo, retain
38% voting rights in SpinCo, which would be still minority in terms of voting
power.121
120

See supra Part II.C.1.a.
This issue was addressed as one of the risk factors in the New SpinCo’s registration
statement. Hamilton Beach, Registration Statement, at 18. (“After the spin-off, holders of
our [the SpinCo’s] Class A Common and holders of our [the SpinCo’s] Class B Common
121
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Some might question why this situation poses a problem, given that
ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stockholders’ voting rights decreased from 75%
(in Table 2) to 62% (in Table 4) before and after the spin-off transaction.
Others might argue that given that ParentCo already had a dual-class stock
structure before the spin-off, the disparity between economic interests and
voting rights in SpinCo is similar to what ParentCo shareholders contracted
into.
However, the real issue here involves vote dilution. Specifically, the
concern is that the voting power that ParenCo’s low-vote Class A
stockholders have in SpinCo will not be 77% (as alleged by the managers),
but will instead be closer to 38%, due to the stock conversion provision. On
the flip side, ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stockholders will maintain the
majority of voting control in SpinCo close to 62% with much less equity
interests of 23%. This actual change is possible because both ParentCo and
SpinCo had a dual-class stock structure along with the conversion provision.
In that sense, even though a dual-class stock structure was not a new
implementation to the SpinCo, its existence itself substantially increased
potential agency costs.
Nevertheless, the degree of voting control in SpinCo by the insiders of
ParentCo is not certain because it relies on the conversion rate of high-to-low
vote stock. If significant numbers of high-vote stock in SpinCo held by the
outside investors are dormant, it is still possible that the insiders’ voting rights
do not sufficiently increase to become the majority in voting as quickly as the
insider wants.
d. SpinCo’s Governance Transformation through Spin-off
As we discussed earlier in Part I.B.2., the current law grants ParentCo’s
managers ample discretion in setting corporate governance arrangements of
SpinCo’s charters without shareholder approval. On top of the voting rights
reallocation discussed above in NACCO/HBB spin-off, ParentCo managers
proactively exercised this discretion and unilaterally made additional changes
to SpinCo’s charter provision. The SpinCo’s charter was largely modeled
after ParentCo’s charter, but it implemented new anti-takeover provisions
that ParentCo does not have (e.g., supermajority voting requirement, 122 a

generally will vote together on most matters submitted to a vote of our stockholders.
Consequently, as holders of our Class B Common convert their shares of our Class B
Common into shares of our Class A Common, the relative voting power of the remaining
holders of our Class B Common will increase.”).
122
RESTATED CERTIFICATION OF INCORPORATION OF HAMILTON BEACH BRAND
HOLDING COMPANY, Article V Section 3 & Section 4, Article VI, and Article VII.
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limit on shareholder actions in written consent, 123 limit on shareholders’ right
to call a special meeting, 124 limit on shareholders’ right to amend bylaws125).
In particular, SpinCo made changes to ParentCo’s provision on dividend
by adding one new paragraph at the end of the exact same wording to
ParentCo's provision.126 The newly added part in SpinCo charter specifically
states that spin-offs would be another exception to the equal distribution
requirement in dividends:
provided, further, that in the case of any other distribution of stock
of any subsidiary of the Corporation that occurs after the date of
the Spin-Off, shares of Class A common stock of such subsidiary
may be distributed with respect to Class A Common Stock and
shares of Class B common stock of such subsidiary may be
distributed with respect to Class B Common Stock. (emphasis
added).127
Consequently, unlike ParentCo’s charter provision requiring an equal
stock distribution to both high-vote and low-vote stockholders, the new
SpinCo charter provision mandates that in the future low-vote Class A stock
shall be distributed only to the Class A stockholders and high-vote Class B
Stock shall be distributed only to the Class B stockholders. This same-kind
123

Id. Article VII (a).
Id. Article VII (b).
125
Id. Article VIII ("Article I, Sections 1, 3 and 8, Article II, Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 and
Article VII of the Bylaws may not be amended or repealed by the stockholders, and no
provision inconsistent therewith may be adopted by the stockholders, without the affirmative
vote of the holders of at least 80% of the voting power of the outstanding Voting Stock,
voting together as a single class.”).
126
RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF NACCO INDUSTRIES, INC., Article
Fourth. 6. (Mar. 31, 1993).
127
RESTATED CERTIFICATION OF INCORPORATION OF HAMILTON BEACH BRAND
HOLDING COMPANY, Article IV. Section 3. 6. The full text of the provision is as follows:
[E]ach share of Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock shall be equal
in respect of rights to dividends and other distributions in cash, stock or property of
the Corporation, provided that in the case of dividends or other distributions payable
in stock of the Corporation, including distributions pursuant to stock split-ups or
divisions of stock of the Corporation which occur after the date of the SpinOff, only shares of Class A Common Stock shall be distributed with respect to
Class A Common Stock and only shares of Class B Common Stock shall be
distributed with respect to Class B Common Stock, and provided, further, that in
the case of any other distribution of stock of any subsidiary of the Corporation that
occurs after the date of the Spin-Off, shares of Class A common stock of such
subsidiary may be distributed with respect to Class A Common Stock and shares of
Class B common stock of such subsidiary may be distributed with respect to
Class B Common Stock.
124
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stock distribution requirement applies to a distribution of any subsidiary
company’s stock after the spin-off. This charter provision explicitly and
perpetually stopped the dilution of voting rights of the high-vote Class B
stockholders.
More importantly, due to this new provision on unequal distribution, the
current allocation of voting rights between Class A and Class B stockholders
is not final. Since the new SpinCo’s charter provision allows the board to
make a heterogeneous stock distribution for different classes of stockholders
in spin-off, it is possible that the high-vote Class B stockholders in SpinCo
will get even greater voting rights in the future through subsequent spin-offs.
In this way, the adoption of dual-class stock structure in SpinCo can enhance
the insiders’ voting rights without any monitoring mechanism and magnifies
the disparity between equity interests and voting rights.
As such, the managers of ParentCo unilaterally changed governance
arrangements of SpinCo by implementing charter provisions that
shareholders would have likely resisted if it were up for ParentCo’s
shareholder vote for the amendment. Under the new governance
arrangements, the rights and power of ParentCo stockholders seem to have
fundamentally changed.
2. Tax law: Analysis on the “Continuity of Interest” Requirement
a. Interrupted Continuity
Let us develop the discussion further by combining corporate issues
arising from dual-class stock with tax law. The spin-off of HBB by NACCO
was carefully designed to qualify as tax-free under Section 355 of the
Code,128 which is supported by the legal opinion of NACCO’s legal counsel,
McDermott, Will & Emery. 129 As demonstrated in Subpart B, dual-class
structures exacerbate agency problems by creating discrepancies in
shareholders’ voting rights before and after the spin-off. 130 If such
discrepancies occur during an acquisitive reorganization, such as mergers and
acquisitions, shareholders can voice their opinions through the shareholder
approval process. 131 However, there is no mechanism for shareholders to
128

Hamilton Beach Brand Holding Company, Registration Statement, supra note 104,

at 6.
129

Id., at Exhibit 8.1.
See supra Subpart B.
131
See H. Kirt Switzer & Gary B. Wilcox, Corporate Acquisitions – (A), (B), and (C)
Reorganizations, 771-4th TAX MGMT. BNA US INCOME PORTF., I.D.6. (2017) (discussing
shareholder approval in acquisitive reorganizations); CLAIRE HILL ET AL., MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS: LAW, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 35–38 (2016) (discussing the shareholder
approval process in mergers and acquisitions).
130
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monitor the governance disparity when it comes to a spin-off.132
The rationale of the tax-free benefits for both an acquisitive
reorganization, such as mergers and acquisitions, and divisive reorganization,
such as spin-offs, is that those reorganizations are mere changes in corporate
form.133 From a tax perspective, then, the question becomes whether those
corporate reorganizations with significant governance changes could still be
viewed as mere changes in form and thus deserving of tax-free benefits. This
question boils down to the continuity of interest requirement by which the
shareholders of the acquired corporation in a merger or acquisition or the
parent company in a spin-off must maintain some equity portion in the
continuing enterprise to gain tax-free status. 134 This Article claims that
corporate governance changes (more specifically, voting right changes) via
spin-off potentially interrupt the continuity of equity interest and thus may
render the transaction a taxable event.
As explained in II.C, the continuity of interest doctrine at issue requires
the historic shareholders of ParentCo to continue to control all the resulting
corporations. 135 This is a common requirement applicable to all tax-free
reorganizations, including mergers and acquisitions and spin-offs.136 As to
the quantitative standard to determine continuity of interest, several examples
in the regulations indicate that a 50% equity interest should be sufficient in
the case of acquisitive reorganizations, and the regulations for other types of
reorganizations, including spin-offs, also refer to that standard. 137
The continuity of interest requirement has been criticized, however, as
an insufficient criterion for a tax-free benefit.138 Part II.A. provides a broad,
policy-level criticism, arguing that allowing tax-free benefits to spin-offs
132

See supra Part I.B.2.
SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 803.
134
See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1); MCM AHON, supra note 61, at 1173.
135
See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D); Gregory N. Kidder (Steptoe & Johnson LLP), Basics of
Tax-Free Spin-Offs Under Section 355, 5 J. INT’L TAX’N 50, 55 (Nov. 2011) (“Where the
spin-off involves a divisive “D” reorganization, there is an additional requirement that either
[the parent company] or its shareholders control the spun off corporation immediately after
the transaction.”).
136
Treas. Reg. §§1.368-1(b), 1.355-2(c).
137
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-(e)(2)(v) Ex. 1; Rev Proc. 77-37,
1977-2 C.B. 568 (discussing the 50% benchmark for satisfying the continuity of interest
requirement); Rev. Proc. 86-42, 1986-2 C.B. 722; STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL LATHROPE,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 403–04, 491–93 (9th ed. 2016) (discussing
continuity of interest requirement in the context of acquisitive reorganizations and spin-offs).
138
For a recent reform proposal that seeks to provide for an objective continuity of
interest testing period and for efforts to narrow the scope of Section 355 so that it cannot be
used to effectuate a tax-free sale of a subsidiary to a new economic group in avoidance of
Congress desire to repeal the General Utilities doctrine, see Bret Wells, Reform of Section
355, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 447 (2018).
133
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encompassing significant governance changes is not a good tax policy. This
Subpart further elaborates on the criticism based on the doctrinal analysis of
the current rule applicable to the NACCO-HBB spinoff case.
Commentators criticize that the continuity of interest requirement in
general does not do enough to distinguish a corporate reorganization that
deserves tax-deferred treatment from a regular sale that should be taxed
currently in the context of mergers and acquisitions. 139 Furthermore, when it
comes to spin-offs, current law fails to ask deeper questions about the basic
premise of the doctrine: whether a spin-off (or corporate reorganization more
broadly) represents pure paper transactions for shareholders and mere
changes in corporate form. 140 There is no clear rule that requires the resulting
corporations to preserve “the corporate identity” of historic ParentCo
following a spin-off “in a real and meaningful way.”141 It merely requires
historic ParentCo shareholders to receive more than about 50% of SpinCo’s
instrument labeled “equity.”142 Almost any type of stock will serve as a valid
distribution.143 SpinCo may distribute non-voting preferred stock to historic
shareholders of ParentCo, who previously owned voting stock. In this case,
the distribution will be treated as a sufficient equity interest in SpinCo when
it comes to testing continuity of interest. 144 Thus, any qualitative changes in
the stock, such as the voting powers of historic shareholders or the corporate
governance disparity between ParentCo and SpinCo, are not considered. 145
Current law is simply content with the technical continuity of interest as long
as historic shareholders receive more than about 50% of equity interest in
SpinCo.146
But what if historic shareholders experienced a qualitative difference in
equity before and after the spin-off? Are those continued interests really
continuous? Is not the continuity interrupted if the intrinsic value of the equity
interest has been altered significantly (with the exception of continuing a
certain percentage ratio in both old and new corporations)?
Tax law has not addressed this issue and does not consider any qualitative
difference in stock, such as in shareholders’ rights and in corporate
governance structure, emerging through spin-off transactions.147 To address
139

Blank, supra note 73, at 2.
Id. at 24 (“Effectively, the doctrine judges whether a thing has been changed by
looking to its owners rather than to the thing itself.”).
141
See id. at 28.
142
See id. at 41–42 and text accompanying supra note 73.
143
See Blank, supra note 73, at 42.
144
Id.
145
See id.
146
See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1); MCM AHON, supra note 61, at 1173.
147
Blank, supra note 73, at 26 (quoting Monty Python: And Now for Something
140
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this oversight, this Article argues that the continuity would be interrupted not
only when historic shareholders fail to continue a certain percentage of
ownership in SpinCo, but also when the intrinsic value of the equity interest,
such as voting rights, has been substantially changed during reorganization.
As the continuity of interest requirement is common throughout all types
of corporate reorganizations, a similar observation by a tax scholar is found
in the context of acquisitive reorganizations, such as mergers and
acquisitions. 148 Joshua Blank offers two scenarios where the continuity is
disrupted and thus “shareholders” are required to recognize gains in the
acquisitive reorganizations.149 The first scenario is when voting shareholders
receive non-voting stock.150 Voting rights may carry a premium, because they
represent the power to participate in the election of directors who make
fundamental decisions affecting the strategic direction of the company. 151
The second scenario is the disproportionate reduction in percentage interest
measured by either vote or value. 152 Inferring from other tax code sections on
disproportionate reduction in interest, such disproportionate equity reduction
is deemed to be engaged in a sale rather than a corporate reorganization. 153
Blank concludes that considering the change in the shareholders’ relative
position as a shareholder following a merger or spin-off, neither scenario
should qualify for the tax-free benefit.154
This Article observes that such problems may be more serious with
regard to spin-offs. This is because there exists no systematic shareholder
monitoring process throughout the transaction, whereas shareholder approval
is mandatory in acquisitive reorganizations. Blank’s critique is analogous to
this Article’s inquiry into spin-offs inasmuch as both acquisitive and divisive
reorganizations share the continuity of interest doctrine. 155 Hence, Blank’s
two scenarios to analyze the continuity of interest requirement are useful
tools for analyzing the requirement in the context of spin-offs.
Based on this finding, let us now return to the NACCO-HBB spin-off
case, where the historic shareholders’ role and rights within the enterprises
have changed significantly following a spin-off.156 The NACCO-HBB dual
Completely Different (1971) [VHS] Directed by I. MacNaughton. London: Columbia
Pictures Co.).
148
See Blank, supra note 73.
149
Id. at 8.
150
Id. at 43.
151
See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 91, at 594.
152
Blank, supra note 73, at 8 (E.W. Scripps and Belo were spun off with dual-class stock
in 2007).
153
Id. at 62.
154
Id. at 60.
155
Id. at 14.
156
Id. at 26.
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stock example comes under both scenarios—distributing non-voting stock to
historic voting shareholders and the disproportionate reduction in interest. 157
In other words, shareholders’ new stock in SpinCo is something completely
different from that in ParentCo. Such a change may make the HBB spin-off
something more than a mere change in form, leading to the conclusion that
HBB shareholders should not qualify for the tax-free benefit.158
We note that the above argument is contentious because its conclusion
inevitably urges a fundamental overhaul of the continuity of interest rule.
Indeed, the continuity of interest doctrine has failed to serve as an adequate
means to distinguish between certain reorganizations that ought to receive
tax-free benefits and other ordinary sales. 159 One of the reasons that the
continuity of interest has failed to serve its purpose might be its unjustifiable
obsession with the quantitative analysis of the continued equity. This
approach disproves the effectiveness of the continuity of interest requirement,
considering the fact that there has not been any meaningful report of any
transactions that have failed to satisfy such requirement.160
In sum, roughly 50% of historic shareholders’ equity interest in the
aggregate thus far satisfies the continuity of interest requirement, regardless
of whether the fundamental rights of shareholders continue before and after
the spin-off.161 However, this traditional approach cannot solve more recent
problems regarding spin-offs—i.e., significant change in the quality of
historic shareholders’ voting power via dual-class stock. 162 Thus, even if
historic shareholders continue to hold a continuity of propriety interest, this
Article argues that the continuity of propriety interest requirement might not
be satisfied if their rights with regard to the stock have changed significantly.
b. Dual-class Stock and Post-Distribution Continuity
In Subpart 2.a., we examined the continuity of interest doctrine by taking
a snapshot as of the closing date of the spin-off transaction. Now, let us
examine whether such continuity remains during a certain period after the

157

Id. at 60–61.
Ajay K. Mehrotra, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Materialism, 83 IND. L. J. 881,
896 (2008).
159
Id.; Blank, supra note 73, at 44–45.
160
Id. at 44.
161
Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, Effects of Recontracting on Shareholder Wealth,
12 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 437, 439 (1983).
162
See supra Part II.C.1. See also Wei Du, Essay on Anti-takeover Provisions and
Corporate Spin-offs 3901 (May 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State
University), http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations (discussing the change
in corporate governance via spin-off more generally).
158
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spin-off.163
Current law and regulations require historic ParentCo shareholders to
retain a continued equity interest in the ongoing enterprises not only before
the distribution but also afterwards.164 This requirement remains the same as
the pre-1998 regulations that required post-acquisition continuity for
acquisitive reorganizations. 165 In 1998, the post-acquisition continuity
requirement was abandoned, allowing Target shareholders to sell freely the
acquired stock to third parties without violating the continuity of interest
requirement. At the time there was discussion of whether the change should
be extended to divisive reorganizations such as spin-offs. 166 Since then,
however, neither the Treasury nor the IRS has announced a revised position
on the continuity of interest requirement in the corporate divisive context. 167
Current law thus still requires both pre-distribution and post-distribution
continuity of interest. 168
Specifically, Treasury Regulation § 1.355-2(c) dealing with continuity of
interest primarily discusses pre-distribution sales, whereas Treasury
Regulation § 1.355-2(d) dealing with the device limitation that prohibits
shareholders from cashing out primarily discusses post-distribution sale. 169
The device regulation is considered “a particularly strong form of continuity
of interest requirement with respect to post-distribution sale.”170 Furthermore,
the continuity of interest requirement in Treasury Regulation § 1.355-2(c)
broadly includes post-distribution sales in the issue of continuity of interest.
It does not explicitly limit the issues to pre-distribution sales.171 Furthermore,
Section 355(e) of the Code, which requires that spin-offs not be followed by
any pre-arranged change-in-control (50% or more) of either ParentCo or
SpinCo within a period beginning two years before the distribution and
ending two years after the distribution, appears to reinforce the postdistribution continuity of interest requirement. 172
163
I.R.C. § 355(e); Blank, supra note 73, at 37; David F. Shores, Reexamining
Continuity of Shareholder Interest in Corporate Divisions, 18 VA. TAX REV. 473, 480–486
(1999).
164
Id. at 486.
165
SCHWARZ & LATHROPE, supra note 137, at 492 n.118.
166
Id., at 492 n.118; Shores, supra note 163, at 475 (arguing that the revised regulations
for acquisitive reorganizations should apply to divisive reorganizations as well).
167
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-2(c),2(d).
168
Id.
169
Shores, supra note 163, at 497–498.
170
Id. at 481.
171
Id.
172
I.R.C.§ 355(e), often called the “Morris Trust” rules, was enacted in 1997, followed
several spin-merger deals where ParentCo extracted substantial cash proceeds by putting
leverage on SpinCo. Congress thought that a spin-merger with a 50% change in ownership
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Nonetheless, the interrupted continuity problem becomes more puzzling
when we expand our analysis from a static snapshot of the continuity to a
certain timeframe after the spin-off. Indeed, as explained above, the divisive
reorganization rules have a more vigorous continuity of interest requirement
than the acquisitive reorganization rules. However, the continuity of interest
requirement for spin-offs attempted to eliminate the ownership change from
historic shareholders to a third party, such as a spin-off followed by a merger
with a third party, rather than addressing the ownership change within historic
shareholders after spin-off.173 However, as in the NACCO-HBB case where
conversion from Class B to Class A is anticipated, we are now faced with the
latter form of ownership change that should also be considered in the context
of post-distribution continuity of interest.
Due to the lack of rules regarding this newly emerged form of postdistribution ownership change, NACCO-HBB insiders argued that their spinoff would not be taxed. They made this argument because it is not certain
whether any increase in voting power in HBB by NACCO Class B
shareholders by conversion is considered an “acquisition” after the spin-off
that renders the transaction taxable. 174 It is true that the regulations have not
anticipated this new form of post-distribution ownership change not caused
by a merger or acquisition with a third party, as in the NACCO-HBB case.
However, it also seems questionable whether the law only intends to prohibit
a shareholder sale to third parties and not those cases where the ownership
change among existing shareholders enables insiders who were previously
or greater (measured by vote or value) looked more like a sale than a restructuring, and it
thus concluded that it should not qualify for tax-free treatment if, as part of the plan of
distribution, one or more persons acquires at least a 50% interest of either ParentCo stock or
SpinCo stock. If that acquisition occurs within a period beginning two years before the
distribution and ending two years after the distribution, it is presumed to be a part of the plan
of distribution, i.e., spin-off. This essentially requires a 2-year pre-distribution and a 2-year
post-distribution holding requirement for both ParentCo and SpinCo, which in effect
reinforces the post-distribution continuity of interest requirement. Shores, supra note 163, at
536–37. Today, there are a great number of regulations that try to define what is and what
isn’t a prearranged transaction.
173
Michael L. Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 S.M.U. L. REV.
239, 272 (2003); George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Divisions, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 289, 296
(2003).
174
NACCO, Form S-1, at 7. The parties further argue that even if so, it does not cause
50% or more changes triggering a taxable transaction under Section 355(e). However, a 50%
or more requirement has been criticized severely because any post-distribution merger would
easily avoid the requirement by making the smaller of the two merging corporations the
surviving entity. Shores, supra note 163, at 537. If the parties arrange for the survival of the
smaller of the two merging corporations, the shareholder of the smaller (or transferee)
corporation would hold less than 50% of its stock following the merger and would be treated
as having acquired less than 50% of the larger (or transferor) corporation’s stock.
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unable to amend the charter to now turn the group into a supermajority that
can amend the charter. This is exactly what we examined as the qualitative
difference in equity before and after the spin-off in Subpart 2.a. This scenario
violates the continuity of interest requirement and thus is not a mere
reorganization that is entitled to tax-free treatment.175
Notably, a recent IRS Revenue Procedure and private letter ruling seem
to approve a spin-off transaction harnessing dual-class stock structure.176 The
ruling provides tax-free benefits to a transaction where the public ParentCo
distributes the high-vote stock to the public and retains the low-vote stock,
which is then used to redeem existing debt to a creditor. 177 The ruling in
principle requires a company to maintain the dual-class structure for 24
months or more after the spin-off. 178 A significant exception to this
requirement, however, is that SpinCo may unwind the dual-class structure
within 24 months if it merges with a third-party acquirer. This unwinding can
take place as long as there were no negotiations during the 24-month period
prior to the distribution, and as long as no more than 20% of the interest in
vote or value is acquired by any existing shareholder who owns more than
20% of stock in vote or value.179 These “safe harbors” for unwinding a dualclass structure reiterate the safe harbors in Revenue Procedure 2016-40.
A practitioner interprets this ruling as the IRS basically blessing the dualclass structure for tax-free spin-offs.180 However, such an interpretation of
the IRS’ position may be overly positive and perhaps misleading. First, the
Revenue Procedure limited its discussion on the 80% control requirement
when the SpinCo adopts dual-class stock which ParentCo distributes in a
transaction that otherwise qualifies the remaining requirements under Section
355 of the Code. Second, the ruling at issue involves a creditor for whom the
low-vote class stock is to be used to redeem the ParentCo’s debt, so it makes
sense to require maintaining dual-class structure for certain periods of time
after the spin-off to protect the interests of high-vote shareholders of
175
Yin, supra note 173, at 296. Yin briefly mentions that the ownership change among
the existing shareholders does not disqualify the transaction by illustrating the situation
where ParentCo shareholders receive SpinCo stock proportionally when SpinCo stock is
distributed, which is obviously a different context from the discussion in this paper. Id. at
297.
176
Rev. Proc. 2016-40, 2016 32 I.R.B. 228; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201731004 (Feb. 16,
2017).
177
The creditor immediately sells those low-vote stock to unrelated third parties in
public of private offerings. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201731004, 7 (Feb. 16, 2017).
178
Id. at 9.
179
Id.
180
See generally Alston & Bird, Federal Tax Advisory: Dual-Class Stock Blessed for
Spin
(Sep.
1,
2017),
available
at
https://www.alston.com//media/files/insights/publications/2017/08/dualclass-stock.pdf.
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ParentCo.181 Moreover, both Revenue Procedure and the ruling describe the
fact patterns of ownership change between shareholders and a third party
after the spin-off, with which the extant rule is familiar.
Therefore, it is likely more proper to note that neither the IRS nor the
Treasury have noticed the potential problems with continuity of interest
arising from the ownership change between historic shareholders derived
from dual-class stock. We urge the IRS to consider this issue, as discussed
further in Part III.C. More fundamentally, it is necessary to update the rule to
consider post-distribution continuity within historic shareholders.
III.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

In this Part, we propose legal solutions to the problems we have identified
above. As what we believe is the first paper to integrate corporate and tax law
considerations simultaneously on the issue, we argue that neither corporate
nor tax laws have caught up with the evolution of spin-off practice in the real
world. This gap between law and practice creates an unexpected legal
loophole that solicits agency problems. In particular, managers’ unfettered
discretion in modifying corporate governance arrangements in spin-offs
needs to be checked, and both corporate law and tax law can play that role by
making necessary changes to the current framework.
A. Constructive Cooperation of Corporate Law and Tax Law
Spin-offs are corporate law transactions, but the completion of spin-offs
is often conditioned on obtaining tax-free treatment of those spin-offs. Given
that both corporate law and tax law are key elements of spin-off transactions,
a cooperative solution of corporate law and tax law would provide more
holistic normative policy implications for the unique problem (i.e., unilateral
governance changes) revealed earlier in this Article.
A potential concern for invoking tax law to address the problems relating
to changes in voting rights through spin-offs is that tax law is an imperfect
instrument for addressing agency costs incurred by managers. 182 Although
there are some topics that policymakers may seek in order to correct problems
in corporate governance and managerial opportunism, 183 there is significant
181

If not, a third party that acquires a low-vote stock may unwind the dual-class structure
immediately after the tax-free spin-off, which would harm the voting rights of the high-vote
shareholders of ParentCo.
182
David M. Schizer, Tax and Corporate Governance: The Influence of Tax on
Managerial Agency Costs, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE 1 (Jeffery N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., July 2015), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2501706.
183
For example, there are certain tax rules to discourage pyramidal business structure
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hesitation to introduce tax law as a tool to mitigate the problems in non-tax
areas.184 Despite the general reluctance of using tax law as a tool for non-tax
problems, there are in fact only a few examples of literature by tax scholars
particularly discussing the efficacy of tax law influencing corporate
governance. 185 As Schizer has provided, it might be due to the fact that
neither tax experts nor corporate experts usually have detailed knowledge of
the other field to embark on the interdisciplinary research.186 Moreover, it is
difficult to find any substantial discussion about tax-free reorganizations and
managerial agency costs, with the exception of Schizer’s admission that
managers might not always be faithful to shareholders when they plan taxoriented corporate structuring, and that it is difficult for shareholders to
monitor whether managers are pursuing shareholders’ interests or their own
due to the cryptic tax law and competing considerations. 187 However, instead
of offering further analysis, Schizer concludes that the “influence of tax on
corporate governance—tax structuring that camouflages self-interested deal
terms—is new to the academic literature.”188
We have demonstrated that the change in voting rights through spin-offs
is a good example of how managers may disguise their self-interested
corporate restructuring in the esoteric corporate reorganization processes. 189
Most importantly for managers’ purposes, the restructuring should be a
divisive reorganization, such as spin-off, to block shareholder monitoring and
to avoid realizing any taxable gain. To address this problem, we argue that
not only corporate law but also tax law should exert such efforts. Given that
sophisticated managers already take advantage of tax law to camouflage their
and excessive golden parachutes and to encourage performance-based compensation. See,
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999, 162(m).
184
See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 1673 (2015) (arguing that corrective taxation may not efficiently address various
negative externalities caused by different agents); Giorgia Maffini & John Vella, Evidencebased Policy Making? The Commission’s Proposal for an FTT 20 (Oxford University Centre
for Business Taxation, WP 15/15, 2015) (opposing the Financial Transaction Tax introduced
to deter transactions that do not enhance market efficiency because it does not distinguish
“bad” transactions from “good” transactions).
185
See, e.g., Noam Noked, Can Taxes Mitigate Corporate Governance Inefficiencies?,
9 WM. & M ARY BUS. L. REV. 221, 224 (2017) (arguing that tax law has limited ability to
“effectively mitigate corporate governance problems and increase efficiency”); Schizer,
supra note 182, at 2 (contending that “tax is a poor fit” to tackle corporate governance
problems due to the lack of expertise by tax authorities); Richard M. Hynes, Taxing Control,
38 J. CORP. L. 567, 584 (2013) (implying that introducing the corrective tax on the firm
control would be inefficient, but in a less critical way).
186
Schizer, supra note 182, at 1.
187
Id. at 20.
188
Id. at 21.
189
See supra Part II.C.
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self-interested corporate deal terms, it is less convincing to maintain
antipathy toward tax law in addressing corporate problems.
Furthermore, the concern of scholars who disapprove of using tax law as
a tool to address corporate issues perhaps reflects the imposition of “uniform
and mandatory rules” that have poorly tailored scope and result in unintended
negative effects. 190 By contrast, what we propose in this Article is to revoke
the tax-free benefits for certain restructuring transactions and to revert to the
default rule where those transactions would have realized taxable gain,
provided that those transactions are likely to be used as camouflage for
managerial entrenchment. Corporate law would be the most direct instrument
to challenge this issue, but tax law might be used as an additional stick by
revoking the exceptional tax-free benefit in such unusual situations. It is not
persuasive for tax law to neglect an issue essential to one of its established
requirements for tax-free reorganization, i.e., continuity of interest. Hence,
we expect that tax authorities’ willingness to closely examine the problem
will facilitate a more fundamental action by other agencies in charge of
managerial entrenchment. Encouraging the constructive cooperation between
the two agencies will eventually fill the gap between tax law and managerial
agency costs in corporate law.
B. Corporate Law: Need for Shareholder Approval Requirement
Once ParentCo managers unilaterally amend a SpinCo charter deviating
from ParentCo’s charter, it becomes extremely difficult for low-vote
shareholders to reverse the amendment. The low-vote shareholders’ voting
rights to amend corporate charters face two large, perhaps insurmountable,
hurdles. First, state corporate laws mandate that only directors have a right to
initiate a charter amendment. Shareholders can only vote on what directors
propose and do not have the power to initiate a charter amendment process
no matter how desirable they find one. 191 Second, especially when their
voting power has been substantially diluted through the use of dual-class
stock as discussed in the NACCO-HBB case in Part II.C., shareholders may
no longer have the requisite voting control to dictate or influence the outcome.
For instance, if the manager and the insiders have more than 50% of the
voting power through dual-class stock, the public shareholders will be simply
out of luck in being able to have any meaningful say in the corporate

190

Schizer, supra note 182, at 4–6; Noked, supra note 185, at 263 (opposing the use of
corrective tax to reduce agency costs from entrenchment because it is hard to assess the
benefit and cost associated with the tax); Hynes, supra note 185, at 569–70 (implying that
introducing the corrective tax on the firm control would be inefficient in a less critical way).
191
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 242.
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governance arrangement. 192
1. Limit of Ex-Post Mechanisms
As such, unilaterally amended charter provisions are extremely difficult
for shareholders to remove and ParentCo’s shareholders can think of their
freedom to sell their stock if they are dissatisfied with the new corporate
governance arrangements of SpinCo. Although the right to sell stock is
unconstrained, the stockholders may be forced to sell it at a depressed price
when the distributed stock comes with a suboptimal governance structure.
Since shareholders have to bear the loss from the depressed stock price, being
able to sell the stock itself is not a reasonable option for the dissatisfied
shareholders. As a result, this option may provide little or no deterrence
against managers’ adoption of suboptimal governance regime through spinoffs.
When shareholders choose not to sell their stock, traditionally the
shareholders can express their dissatisfaction by exercising their voting rights
or by bring a suit against managers. But in companies with dual-stock
structure, the majority voting power is held by the insiders and often it is
impossible to obtain enough votes to remove directors or pass shareholder
proposals.
Another possible mechanism for shareholders is to bring a shareholder
lawsuit against managers who changed governance structure. In corporate
spin-offs, managers have the unfettered discretion in deciding 1) whether to
divide a company into separate entities (“business decision”); and 2) how to
set up a corporate governance structure of a new SpinCo separated from
ParentCo (“governance decision”). Exempting spinoffs from shareholder
voting is intended to maximize the efficiency of a “business decision.” But
It is worth noting that the Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), the most
influential proxy advisory firm, made a new voting guideline on unilateral bylaw/charter
amendments in 2014. The guideline recommends that shareholders vote against directors
who become involved with unilateral bylaw/charter amendments that could adversely impact
shareholders after IPO. The fact that the ISS takes the potential risk of unilateral
bylaw/charter amendment is welcoming, but the ISS’s guideline has its own limitation to
monitor unilateral charter amendments made through spin-offs. After all, the ISS only deals
with a post-IPO charter amendment—but SpinCo’s charter is technically neither an IPO
charter nor a post-IPO charter. There has been no incidence of the ISS’s negative voting
recommendation based on unilateral charter amendment through spin-offs yet. Also, most
companies that could significantly amend charters through spin-offs have controlling
shareholders who already exercise a significant voting control. Thus, they are relatively less
influenced by institutional shareholders’ vote and largely guided by proxy advisors instead,
including the ISS. See ISS, United States Proxy Voting Guidelines, Benchmark Policy
Recommendations
14
(2018),
available
at
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf.
192
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when such special treatments extend to “governance decisions,” particularly
implementing a dual-class structure in SpinCo, unexpected agency costs may
arise. Thus, under current corporate law regime, both decisions are bundled
and subject to the business judgement rule (“BJR”) presumption in favor of
managers’ actions.193
Possibly, despite the BJR protection, low-vote shareholders still can
bring a suit against managers or high-vote shareholders regarding spin-offs
based on the breach of duty of loyalty. 194 The fiduciary duty of loyalty
mandates that fiduciaries act in the best interests of shareholders rather than
their own interests. 195 Even if ParentCo managers’ discretion to declare
dividends and set SpinCo’s charter provisions has been generally protected
by the business judgment rule, these managers are still subject to the fiduciary
duty of loyalty owed to ParentCo’s shareholders. 196Thus, when the managers’
declaration of dividends becomes an obvious conflict of interest, the
managers may become liable for violating the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Nonetheless, these types of shareholder litigation have been extremely rare,
and spin-offs have been strongly regarded as business decisions as a whole.
Thus, the court needs to discern “business decisions” and “governance
decisions” elements in spin-offs and limit the business judgment protection
only to the “business decisions” element. The court may then monitor
management’s unilateral governance changes under the heightened judicial
scrutiny, as courts do in other contexts of corporate law, even when those
changes do not necessarily violate the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
2. Benefits of Ex-Ante Shareholder Approval
As discussed above, once management unilaterally adopts managementempowering provisions (including anti-takeover provisions) in corporate
charters, it may be nearly impossible for shareholders to reverse those charter
provisions by using their rights under the current corporate law regime. Thus,
we need to turn to possible new legal constraints against management’s
discretion in spin-offs. More direct and meaningful checks on the managerial
opportunism in governance changes through spin-offs may be imposed by
requiring a shareholder vote for certain spin-off transactions. Currently
shareholders do not have any right to vote on a spin-off decision made by
193

See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
The Delaware Supreme Court confirmed that corporate officers owe the same
fiduciary duty as directors. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A. 2d 695 (Del. 2009).
195
See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), Weinberger v.
UOP Inc., 456 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983), aff’d, 497A. 2d 792 (Del. 1985).
196
The fiduciary duty is owed only to shareholders of ParentCo, not to SpinCo
shareholders or potential investors.
194
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management. This voting right differs from the shareholders’ voting rights to
amend corporate charter in the sense that voting requirement for a spin-off
itself can be an ex-ante preventive mechanism to management’s unilateral
governance changes.
Shareholder approval requirement would mitigate agency costs that
could arise from the potential managerial entrenchment associated with their
unilateral governance changes. In order to obtain a shareholder approval,
managers may not propose antitakeover provisions unless there is a
convincing need for the change. Thus, the existence of shareholder approval
requirement itself has an ex-ante deterrence effect on the entrenching
governance changes. Along with this benefit, a shareholder approval
requirement may incur some costs such as the delay in completing a spin-off
transaction in order to obtain shareholder approval separately, the costs
associated with shareholder vote process, or the risk of remaining with less
efficient governance arrangements when managers fail to obtain shareholder
approval.
These costs, however, would not be prohibitively high compared to the
benefits, because the requirement does not ban managers’ changes entirely,
but constraints to a certain degree. If the proposed changes increase
shareholder value, a managers’ proposal to amend organizational documents
would be more compelling to shareholders and more likely to get shareholder
approval. Also, the shareholder approval would not unevenly constraint spinoffs, but rather align governance changes during spin-offs with those of the
other context of corporate law because Managers have enjoyed the overinclusive privilege in making governance changes during spin-offs.
There are multiple ways to implement a shareholder approval
requirement for spin-offs. First, we can require shareholder voting when the
relative size of the spun-off company is substantially large. This is similar, in
spirit, to excusing a shareholder vote in a merger transaction when the
acquiring company issues less than 20% of the outstanding stock.197 In a spinoff, given that a new stock is being distributed to the ParentCo shareholders,
the law will instead have to examine the relative valuations of ParentCo and
SpinCo. The law will require a ParentCo shareholder to vote when SpinCo
constitutes a large fraction of the combined valuation. Second, we can impose
a shareholder vote in case the governance arrangements of the SpinCo in its
charter are substantially different from the ParentCo’s.
Activist shareholders may have a particular role to play in exercising
shareholder power. Those who have enough capital to threaten managers of
a target company have a virtual shareholder approval right. For instance,
when Darden announced a business plan to spin-off Red Lobster, the activist
197

See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 251.
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hedge fund Starboard opposed the spin-off plan.198 After Darden ignored this
opposition, Starboard initiated a proxy fight to turn over the entire board
members of Darden. 199 As such, powerful individual and institutional
investors can effectively constrain managerial discretion by overcoming the
collective action problems associated with shareholder action and ensure
managerial accountability in the spin-off context.
C. Tax Law: Revisit Continuity of Interest Requirement
In addition to the attempt to address the problem in corporate law, this
Article proposes that tax law should support such an attempt. The Article
proposes that tax law should do so by disqualifying certain spin-off
transactions with material changes in corporate governance structures from
tax-free treatment by way of considering both the quantity and quality of
interest when it applies the continuity of interest requirement. Specifically,
the Article urges the IRS to consider issuing a letter ruling or guidance on
certain spin-offs with material changes in corporate governance for the
recently introduced 18-month pilot program on spin-offs, effective until
March 21, 2019.200
1. Time to Revisit Continuity of Interest
The continuity of interest requirement in spin-offs is a simple reiteration
of that requirement in mergers and acquisitions. It has not been revisited since
the regulations on the continuity of interest were amended in 1998 with
respect to acquisitive reorganizations. 201 However, there are many
differences between acquisitive reorganizations and divisive reorganizations
both in corporate law and tax law. As a result, referring to or applying the
rules for the continuity of interest requirement for acquisitive reorganizations
198
Siddharth Cavale & Varun Aggarwal, Starboard Wants to Put Darden’s Red Lobster
Spinoff Plan to Vote, REUTERS, (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dardenstarboard/starboard-wants-to-put-dardens-red-lobster-spinoff-plan-to-voteidUSBREA1N1MT20140224. Since there is no mandatory shareholder approval
requirement for spin-offs, Starboard was seeking to “solicit support for a non-binding
resolution urging the Darden board not to approve a Red Lobster separation.” (emphasis
added).
199
Alexandra Stevenson, Activist Hedge Fund Starboard Succeeds in Replacing Darden
Board, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 10, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/activisthedge-fund-starboard-succeeds-in-replacing-darden-board/ (“Before the shareholder
meeting on the spinoff, Darden’s board abruptly made a deal in May to sell Red Lobster for
$2.1 billion to Golden Gate Capital. The move infuriated shareholders led by Starboard,
which immediately embarked on a campaign to try to replace Darden’s directors.”).
200
Rev. Proc. 2017-52, 2017-41 I.R.B. 283.
201
Supra texts accompany notes 167.
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to divisive reorganization has various conceptual and practical limitations. 202
The agency problem arising from the corporate governance discrepancy
between ParentCo and SpinCo examined in this Article illustrate such
problems. Taxpayers not only create agency problem in corporate law but
also enjoy tax-free benefits by taking advantage of outdated tax rules
regarding the continuity of interest requirement. Thus, we urge the tax
authorities to consider newly emerged problems in relation to the continuity
of interest requirement.
2. The IRS Pilot Program on Spin-offs
One way for tax authorities to review the newly emerged problems and
revisit continuity of interest requirement is the private letter ruling process.
Having limited resources, however, the IRS tends not to issue private letter
rulings or determination letters on transactions with a large number of
complex data points. 203 It is too costly for the IRS to review hundreds of
pages of financial reports to come to a decision. 204 Spin-offs are among the
transactions for which the IRS has a no-rule stance because the agency
considers that some cases surrounding spin-offs may be too fact-intensive for
the agency to issue a ruling. 205 The agency further hesitates to incorrectly
signal to the market that issuing a ruling on certain type of deals implies the
agency’s blessing on them. 206
However, since spin-offs have become a topic of much discussion
between corporations and the IRS in recent years, the IRS has slowly been
opening up its corporate ruling programs in the past year. For example,
Revenue Procedure 2016-40 lifted its ban on private letter ruling requests
with respect to the control requirement when dual-class structure is involved.
The document offered safe harbors for unwinding the dual-class structure
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after the distribution. 207 On July 14, 2016, the IRS released proposed rules on
device and active trade or business requirements under Section 355 – i.e.,
whether a spin-off is a device of distributing earnings and profits to
shareholders, which could make the deal taxable, and whether the spin-off
has a valid business purpose. 208 It subsequently released Revenue Procedure
2016-45, providing that it would accept ruling requests on the device and
active trade or business requirements under Section 355.209 Furthermore, in
May 2017, the IRS released two sets of guidance to resume issuing rulings.
First, Revenue Ruling 2017-09 provided that the IRS would issue rulings on
so-called “north-south transactions,” in which a parent co. (P)’s property is
transferred to its subsidiary (D) in exchange of the subsidiary (D)’s share,
followed by a distribution by the subsidiary (D) of the stock of its controlled
subsidiary (C) to P. 210 Second, Revenue Procedure 2017-38 lifted the ruling
restrictions on transactions involving debt issued in anticipation of a spinoff.211
Finally, on September 21, 2017, the IRS introduced a pilot program
(“Pilot Program”) in which it is willing to issue letter rulings on full spin-off
transactions generally for the next 18 months.212 The Pilot Program expires
on March 21, 2019, but taxpayers may now obtain rulings on various issues
involved in spin-offs that have not been previously available. The agency
explained the change of position as an attempt to provide a better view into
what types of deals are happening in the marketplace. 213 The IRS also seemed
to worry that a no-rule position on certain types of transaction implied that
such transactions were nefarious, resulting in a chilling effect. 214 This Pilot
Program is a great opportunity for the IRS to consider newly emerged
problems in relation to the continuity of interest requirement.
Unfortunately, however, there is no sign of efforts to update or discuss
the outdated continuity of interest doctrine in the course of the recent
developments. The continuity of interest requirement has not been revisited
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since the regulations on the continuity of interest were amended in 1998 with
respect to acquisitive reorganizations. 215 Furthermore, there are many
differences between acquisitive reorganizations and divisive reorganizations
both in corporate law and tax law. As a result, referring to or applying the
rules for the continuity of interest requirement for acquisitive reorganizations
to divisive reorganization has various conceptual and practical limitations. 216
The agency problem arising from the corporate governance discrepancy
between ParentCo and SpinCo examined in this Article illustrate such
problems. Taxpayers not only create agency problem in corporate law but
also enjoy tax-free benefits by taking advantage of outdated tax rules
regarding the continuity of interest requirement. Thus, we urge the IRS to
consider adding newly emerged problems in relation to the continuity of
interest issue to the new list of rulings in the Pilot Program.
3. A Task After the Pilot Program
Although the end of the Pilot Program approaches, there are
unfortunately no sign of efforts to update or discuss the outdated continuity
of interest doctrine in the course of the recent developments. Part of the
reason is that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 brought major tax reforms
during the Pilot Program so that the majority of the resources in the IRS have
been reverted to many topics that the TCJA is focused on, including a large
corporate rate cut and an array of individual tax cuts and increases.217 As a
result, the attention to the Pilot Program has faded away compared to the start
of the Program.
However, there is a silver lining. While wrapping up the result of the
Pilot Program at the end of 2018, the IRS plans to provide a modified and
combined Revenue Procedure for private letter rulings on spin-offs.218 In the
new Revenue Procedure, the IRS expects to make the Pilot Program
permanent, meaning that it will continue to consider full transactional rulings
in addition to its significant issue rulings on spinoffs. 219 Thus, we once again
urge the IRS to consider adding newly emerged problems in relation to the
continuity of interest issue to the new list of rulings on spin-offs.
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CONCLUSION
As one of the first research articles that reveals a potentially toxic
interplay between governance changes and corporate spin-offs, focusing on
dual-class stock adoption as an extreme form of corporate governance change,
this Article claims that purported justifications for giving the managers of
ParentCo unfettered authority to choose SpinCo’s governance arrangements
are significantly attenuated. As a solution, the Article offers cooperative
measures between corporate law and tax law. Since the assumption for the
special treatments of corporate spin-offs—no fundamental changes before
and after a spin-off—have been deviated by managers over time, a legal
prescription for state corporate laws and federal tax laws on corporate spinoffs should evolve accordingly. From a corporate law perspective, the Article
proposes a shareholder approval requirement for corporate spin-offs when a
spin-off company is sizable or when a spin-off results in corporate charter
amendments. Meanwhile, tax law needs to revisit the continuity of interest
requirement to confirm whether a spin-off with corporate governance
changes still meets this requirement. Furthermore, this Article offers new
insights to a long-standing debate on dual-class stock by explaining how
dual-class stock may be vulnerable to agency problems when it meets actual
corporate deals.
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